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THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT:
DOES THE ADA PROTECT A PERSON WITH THE
CHRONIC FATIGUE SYNDROME FROM
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION?
Matthew I. Kozinets*
If you simply cannot manage the climbing and exhaust yourself trying,
fair enough. An honest failure never haunts you because the body
knows no shame. But if you let your mind defeat you, if fear runs
away with itself... it will nag you till your dying day - or until you
return and set things straight 1
John Long on rock
climbing in Yosemite
Valley, California
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I. INTRODUCTION
A person with the chronic fatigue syndrome ("CFS")2 needs

protection from employment discrimination. CFS is an immune disorder
that causes debilitating and prolonged3 fatigue4 in thousands of Americans.5 The symptoms of CFS often interfere with a person's ability to
work. As a result, a person with CFS is vulnerable to employment

discrimination. An employer may discharge, fail to hire, or refuse to
accommodate a person because she7 has CFS.'

2. CFS has many names including chronic fatigue immune dysfunction syndrome [hereinafter
CFIDS], chronic mononucleosis, "yuppie flu," and chronic Epstein-Barr virus. JESSE A. STOFF &
CHARLES R. PELLEGRINO, CHRONIC FATiGUE SYNDROME: THE HIDDEN EPIDEMIC XI (1992)

[hereinafter STOFF & PELLEGRINO]. For additional monikers see Rumi K. Price et al., Estimating
the Prevalence of Chronic Fatigue Syndrome and Associated Symptoms in the Communic,, 107
DEP'T HEALTH & HUM. SERV. PUB. HEALTH REP. 514 (1992) [hereinafter Price].
3. See Ingeborg Lembeck, The Diseaseofthe 90's: ChronicFatigueSyndrome, CAL. THERAPIST, Sept.-Oct. 1993, at 56 [hereinafter Lembeck]. "Many people have experienced symptoms of
up to five years or more, gradually losing their physical stamina, work, source of income, close
relationships and self-esteem:' Id. See also NValders v. Garrett, 765 F. Supp. 303, 306 (E.D. Va.
1991) (finding that CFIDS causes a 50%-60% reduction in activity).
4. Many CFS victims criticize the use of the word "fatigue" because it underestimates the
severity of the symptoms. Thomas L. English, M.D., Skeptical of Skeptics, 265 JAMA 964 (1991)
[hereinafter English]. A physician with CFS writes, "t]here is nothing in your experience in medical
school, residency, or practice with its grueling hours and sleep deprivation that even approaches the
fatigue you feel with this illness." I. See also Karyn L. Feiden, Too Tired Too Often? Surprising
New Culprits,McCALL'S,Sept. 1994, at 42 "[One CFS victim reports]: '[Flatigue is such a light
word for the way I feel ...I go to bed at 8:30 and awaken ten hours later just as tired."' Id.
5. Estimates of the number of people with CFS vary between 200,000 and 6,000,000. See
UnderstandingCFIDS,THE CFIDS CHRONICLE, Summer 1995, at 74,75 [hereinafter Understanding
CFIDS] (explaining that "at least 200,000 to 400,000 adults in the United States have CFIDS'); see
also Cliniciansand ResearchersReport Findingsat National CFS Conference in Fort Lauderdale,
CFIDS TREATMENT NEWS, Winter 1994-95, at I (finding that approximately 250,000-670,000
Americans have CFS); see also Lembeck, supranote 3, at 56 (finding that CFIDS "affects about six
million Americans"). These wide ranging estimates are a testament to how little is yet knovm about
CFS.
6. For a comprehensive explanation of the impact of CFS on a person's life see Living Hell:
The Real World of Chronic FatigueSyndrome (Authentic Pictures video documentary, 1993). To
obtain a copy of this video, contact the CFIDS Foundation, San Francisco, Cal.
7. 1 use the pronoun "she" throughout this article in referring to a person with CFS because
the majority of CFS victims are women. See Price, supra note 2, at 517; see also Paul R. Cheney,
A Guidefor PWCs,CFIDS CHRONICLE, Sept. 1990, at 22. (explaining that "[a]ll segments of the
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Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA") 9
may or may not protect a person with CFS from employment discrimina-

tion."

Title I states that no employer' "shall discriminate against a

qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such

individual!"'2 Thus, two showings constitute a prima facie case under
Title 1: 1) a person must show that she is an individual with a disability;
and 2) that she is "qualified" to do the job she seeks.13 A person with
CFS may or may not succeed in proving these issues. A court may

determine that she is not an "individual with a disability" or that she is
disabled but not "qualified" for the job.14 If this occurs, the court may
conclude that the ADA does not apply, and her Title I claim may fail.

As a result, a person with CFS cannot be certain that the promise of the
ADA reaches her.

Despite this uncertainty, an analysis of the ADA may provide
practical tips on litigation and career planning to a person with CFS. In
population are at risk but women under the age of 45 seem to be most susceptible [to CFS]:.).
8.See, e.g., Walders v. Garrett, 765 F. Supp. 303 (E.D. Va. 1991).
9. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12117 (Supp. V 1994) (prohibiting employment discrimination against
individuals with disabilities in the private sector and in state and local government). The ADA does
not preempt state nondiscrimination laws. Id. § 12201(b). Accord Fair Employment and Housing
Act [hereinafter FEHA], CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 12900-12906 (West 1992). The FEIA was modeled
on the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and interpretations of that law are useful when deciding cases
under FEHA. See Cassista v. Community Foods, Inc., 856 P.2d 1143, 1149 (Cal. 1993).
10. For a comprehensive summary of Title I see Disability Rights Education And Defense
Fund, Inc., Employment (Title 1)Outline (1991 and subsequent revisions) [hereinafter DREDF] (a
copy of this outline is on file with the author). See generally U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT
OPPORTUNITY COMMISSiON, BOOKLET NO. 18, THE ADA: YOUR ELPLOYMENT RIGHTS AS AN
INDIVIDUAL WITH A DISABILITY (1991).
11. Certain employers are not liable under the ADA. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111. "mhe term
'employer' means a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has 15 or more employees... ."Id. Employment agencies, labor organizations, and joint labor-management committees
are also covered. See generallyU.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, BOOKLET
No. 17, THE ADA: YOUR RESt'ONBILImIE As AN EhPLOYER (1991). At the time ofpublication,
the California State Legislature was considering extending Title I ofthe ADA to employers with five
to fourteen employees. See CAL. GOVT. CODE § 12940.3 (West Supp. 1994).
12. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a).
13. See id. For the elements of a prima facie case of unlawful termination under the
Rehabilitation Act, see Lucero v. Hart, 915 F.2d 1367, 1371 (9th Cir. 1990); for the elements of a
prima facie case of failure to accommodate under the Rehabilitation Act, see American Fed'n of
Gov't Employees, Local 51 v. Baker, 59 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) %41,550 at 71,216,71,223 (N.D.
Cal. 1992). Once a Title I claimant proves that the ADA applies to her, i.e., she is a "qualified
individual with a disability," the burden of proof shifts to the defendant employer to prove that no
discrimination occurred, i.e., the employer can prove that the discharge was for a reason unrelated
to her disability or that the failure to accommodate the plaintiff was due to the fact that the accommodation imposed an undue hardship. Walders v. Garrett, 765 F. Supp. 303, 308 (B.D. Va.
1991); see also infra notes 217-19 and accompanying text.
14. See, e-g., Lucero, 915 F.2d at 1371-72.
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analyzing how a court may apply the ADA to a CFS case, a person with

CFS may gain insight into the issues, obstacles, and key facts of an ADA
claim. In addition, such a study may suggest precautions and choices
that a person with CFS may want to consider in seeking a job. As John
Long might say, if a person with CFS is too sick to work, then fair
enough. But if she can work part- or full-time,"5 she should not let the
threat of discrimination discourage her. Instead, she should utilize the
support and guidance of the ADA in her struggle to take her place in the
American office or factory.
11.

INDIVIDUAL WITH A DISABILITY

To state a claim under Title I of the ADA, a person with CFS must
first prove that she is an "individual with a disability."1 6 The ADA
does not provide a laundry list of covered disabilities. 7 Instead, courts
determine the disability issue on a case-by-case basis. The ADA defines
"disability" as a "physical or mental impairment that substantially limits
one or more major life activity."' 8 Thus, a person is not necessarily

15. Treatment of CFS may allow a person to work part or full-time. Interview with Timothy
J. Smith, M.D., in Berkeley, Cal. (June 11, 1993) [hereinafter Smith]. Treatment may include
reduced stress, rest, exercise, and nutrition. Id. For a discussion on the latest treatments, see CFIDS
Doctors Answer Treatment Surveys, CFIDS TREATmENT NEws, Winter 1994-95, at 6-7. Another
form oftreatment is self-acceptance ofone's reduced energy level and disciplining oneself to operate
within those limits. The natural inclination is to push oneself beyond one's limits and thus trigger
a set-back. This behavior results in a see-saw effect upon one's energy level, which undermines
one's ability to maintain a consistent work schedule. Cheney, supra note 7, at 22.
16. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (Supp. V 1994).
17. 29 C.F.R. app. §§ 1630.2(g)-(h) (1994). However, a specific impairment may be so
debilitating that a court will label.it as a recognized disability. See Estate of Reynolds v. Dole, 57
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1848, 1865 (N.D. Cal. 1990) (holding that "both epileptics in general
and specifically this plaintiff are individuals with handicaps."); Reynolds v. Brock, 815 F.2d 571,
573 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that "epileptics are handicapped individuals:) (citations omitted).
18. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g)-). In addition, the ADA offers two
alternative definitions of "disability" that apply to a person who presently suffers no impairment.
A person may be disabled if she has a record of past physical or mental impairment. 42 U.S.C.
§ 12102(2)03). For example, an employer may discover that a person previously suffered from CFS
and decide, based on that history, not to hire the person for fear that she will experience a relapse
on the job. See 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(k). Also, a person may be disabled if she is regarded as
having an impairment. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(C). For example, an employer may erroneously believe
that an employee has CFS because she demonstrates fatigue and discharge her based on this false
belief. See 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(). The purpose of this definition of disability is to protect
individuals whom others regard as disabled due to myths, fears, or stereotypes. Id. Overall, the
ADA may protect a person with CFS if a court determines that she fifills any one of the three
definitions of disability. Id. Most likely, a person with CFS will utilize the first definition because
she presently suffers from CFS. Yet the two alternative definitions may aid a person with CFS if
she fails to prove that she is disabled under the first definition of disability. See Southeastern
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disabled simply because she has an impairment.' 9 A particular impairment may disable one person but not another. 0 A person is disabled
only if her impairment substantially impacts her life.' As a result, a
person with CFS need not prove that CFS constitutes a disability.
Rather, she must prove that she has CFS and that it disables her. Or, as
the ADA puts it, she must show that: 1) she has a physical or mental
impairment (i.e., CFS); and 2) CFS substantially limits her major life activities.Y By proving both prongs of this standard, a person with CFS
may establish that she is an "individual with a disability."
A. Physical or Mental Impairment
A person must prove that she has a physical or mental impairment
as the first step in establishing that she is an "individual with a
disability." This first step requirei a person with CFS to show: 1) that
she has CFS; and 2) that CFS constitutes an "impairment!' within the
scope of the ADA.24 While establishing the latter is relatively simple,
proving a CFS diagnosis is the first major obstacle that faces a Title I
claimant.
The reason CFS is difficult to prove is that a person with CFS will
generally need to present expert testimony and medical records to
establish her diagnosis.' A court will not accept a person's own testimony as sole proof of her illness.26 In Collins v. Sullivan, a person
with CFS claimed disability benefits27 under Title II of the Social

Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 405-06 n.6 (1979) (holding that "a person who has a

record of,or is regarded as having an impairment may, at present have no actual incapacity at all:).
19. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.20).
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g)(1). The Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission examines both a person's impairment (established by medical records) and the person's
ability to handle the impairment (established by interviewing the person) to determine the presence
of a disability. Telephone Interview with Sharon Hawley, Enforcement Manager, U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (July 19, 1994). 'The determining factor is not what disorder

you have but whether it impairs major life activities:' Id.
23. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g)(1).

24. Id.
25. See, e.g., Collins v. Sullivan, No. 92-2890-DLJ, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3898, at *12 (N.D.
Cal. Mar. 22, 1993); accordRingle v. Shalala, No. 92-35224, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 30973, at *3
(9th Cir. Nov. 5, 1993); accord Walders, 765 F. Supp. at 305.
26. Collins, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3898, at *12.

27. Most cases on CFS involve social security benefits. See Michael Quint, New Ailments:
Bane ofInsurers,N.Y. TrNIS, Nov. 28, 1994, at Cl (finding that disability claims for Epstein-Barr
Syndrome grew 320% between 1989 and the first quarter of 1994). However, these cases may
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Security Act.28 The court refused to rely on the plaintiff's undocumented complaints in determining the date of onset of her illness.29
Only upon a hearing pursuant to a reapplication for benefits did the
plaintiff receive a partially favorable decision granting her benefits from
the date that she began seeking medical treatment." She filed for
review of that decision with the United States District Court for the
Northern District of California.3 ' She claimed that her CFS symptoms
began in 1985.32 However, the court concluded that February 22, 1990
- the date of the first blood test that indicated that she was ill - was
the date of onset.33 The administrative law judge stated that "[t]here
was no[] evidence of a consistently high Epstein-Barr titer rate that
would indicate active infection preventing plaintiff from working prior
to February 22, 1990.,,34 The judge added that "[i]n the absence of any
medical evidence ... an onset date [prior to that date] would ...be
arbitrary.' 35 The court's disregard for the plaintiff's undocumented
symptoms illustrates that a person may not be able to prove that she had
CFS prior to the date that her doctor diagnosed her and began compiling
medical records of the illness.
The need to present expert testimony and medical records to
establish a CFS diagnosis is also problematic because a person may be
sick for years before she visits a physician who begins compiling these
medical records. CFS is a fairly new disease, and many people suffer
undiagnosed for years.3 6 Further, once a person realizes that she needs

provide limited precedential value because a court's agenda in a social security case differs from the
agenda in an employment discrimination case. In a social security case, a court is concerned with
malingerers; healthy people vho claim disability simply to receive financial benefits. Thus, the
Department of Health and Human Services engages in a five-stage sequential evaluation process to
determine whether a person is disabled. Collins, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3898, at *4. By contrast,

in an employment discrimination case, a disabled person generally wants to work and sues because
her employer refuses to hire or accommodate her. Telephone Interview with Ellen R. Jordan,

Professor of Law, U.C. Davis (Aug. 15, 1994) [hereinafter Jordan]. Thus, in the latter context, a
court may be more willing to recognize a person's disability and apply a less stringent standard of
proof.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

Collins, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3898, at *1.
Id. at *12.
Id. at *1-*2.
Id. at *2.
Id. at *2.
Id. at *11.

34. Id.

3S. Id. at *12.
36. See Dan McGrath, Shefights to putfatigue on medical chart, SACRAMENTO BEE, Jan. 13,

1993, at A2. One woman went nine years without being diagnosed. Id. "From the beginning,
getting a diagnosis and any care for this disease has been an extraordinary struggle for most of us."
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treatment, she may not be able to afford it if her health insurance does
not cover chronic fatigue? 7 Finally, even after obtaining the necessary
financial resources, she still may spend years trying to find a physician

willing to treat her?8
Many physicians are reluctant to treat CFS because they cannot
diagnose it using traditional diagnostic methods? 9 Typically, a physi-

cian uses a definitive lab test to diagnose a disease.4 Such a test shows
the presence or absence of a known pathogen within a person's body4 '
For instance, a diagnosis of strep throat is proper when infectious
bacteria appear in a throat culture.42 However, a definitive lab test does

not exist for CFS.43 CFS is an immune disorder in which the immune
system works frantically but ineffectively at combatting common
viruses." The cause of this disorder remains unknown. 4 Physicians
have not yet discovered a virus or bacteria to look for under the

microscope. As Dr. Jesse Stoff notes, "CFS ranks among the greatest
diagnostic dilemmas of our time. You can't take a simple, routine throat
culture .... Where CFS is concerned, it's hard to see the beast. Given

the limitations of our present medical technology, we can only follow its
footprints."4 6
Following footprints usually means the application of a symptomatic
diagnosis, which is a nontraditional diagnostic method. A symptomatic diagnosis requires a physician to: 1) identify a number of symptoms;
and 2) conclude that these symptoms constitute a disease.4 In 1994,
the Centers for Disease Control & Prevention ("CDC") identified nine

symptoms as diagnostic criteria for CFS: persistent or recurring severe
ChronicFatigue, 261 JAMA 696, 697 (1989) (letter to the editor).
37. See English, supra note 4, at 964 (discussing the financial dangers faced by CFS patients
who seek treatment for the disease).
38. See English, supra note 4, at 964. "In one early report, the average CFS patient had
previously consulted 16 different physicians. Most were told that they were in perfect health, that
they were depressed ....The situation is better today, but not by much." English, supra note 4,
at 964.
39. STOFF & PELLEGRINO, supra note 2, at 59-60.
40. SToFF & PELLEGRINO, supra note 2, at 59.
41. Smith, supra note 15.
42. STOFF & PELLEGRINO, supra note 2, at 60.
43. Price, supra note 2, at 515. However, recent studies have shown that "CFS can be
clinically diagnosed with several advanced lab tests.' Lembeck, supra note 3, at 57.
44. SToFF & PELLEGRINO, supra note 2, at 309; Lembeck, supra note 3, at 56.
45. Suspected causes include an unidentified virus, genetic predisposition, age, gender, prior
illness, environment, and stress. Lembeck, supra note 3, at 56.
46. STOFF & PELLEGRINO, supra note 2, at 60.
47. See STOFF AND PELLEGRINO, supra note 2, at 61. Price, supra note 2, at 515.
48. STOFF & PELLEGRINO, supra note 2, at 61-86.
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fatigue (which is unexplained, of recent onset, not improved by rest, and

causes substantial reduction in activities); "substantial impairment in
short-term memory or concentration; sore throat; tender lymph nodes;
muscle pain; multi-joint pain without joint swelling or redness; headaches
of a new type, pattern, or severity; unrefreshing sleep; and post-exertional
malaise lasting more than 24 hours." 49
Identification of these symptoms is difficult because many of them
are subjective." A physician cannot prove their existence with objec-

tive, clinical data such as lab tests."1

Instead, a physician must be

willing to believe a person's subjective complaints of pain and fatigue.

If a physician is skeptical of these complaints, he or she may not
be will52
ing to conclude that a person actually is suffering from CFS.
A physician may be skeptical of the subjective complaints of a
person with CFS for several reasons.53 First, many physicians believe

that subjective complaints are inherently unreliable because a person may
invent or exaggerate them.54 Second, the subjective complaints of CFS
are common.55 Everyone feels tired now and then, and a physician may
wonder whether a person who complains of excessive fatigue has a
devastating "syndrome" or is simply a kvetch5 6 Finally, societal

prejudices may fuel skepticism of subjective complaints.5 As noted,
most victims of CFS are women."8 A physician may be more skeptical

49. Understanding CFIDS, supra note 5, at 74. Other common CFIDS symptoms include
cognitive function problems such as word-finding difficulties; comprehension problems; speech
impairment; psychological problems (depression, irritability, anxiety); chills and night sweats;
shortness ofbreath; dizziness and balance problems; sensitivity to heat and/or cold; irritable bowel;
low-grade fever or low body temperature; allergies; chemical sensitivities; and feeling "in a fog."
UnderstandingCFIDS,supra note 5, at 74-75.
50. STOFF & PELEGRINO, supra note 2, at 59-60.
51. But see Issam Bou-Holaigah, M.D., et al., The RelationshipBetween Neurally Mediated
Hypotension and the ChronicFatigue Syndrome, 274 JAMA 961, 961-67 (1995) (explaining that
people with CFS suffer abnormally-reduced heart rate and blood pressure after spending 40 minutes
in an upright position); see also STOFF & PELLEGRINO, supra note 2, at 74-84. Lab tests may
document identification of CFS, such as low functioning natural killer cells, yeast infections, and
chronic viral infections. STonF & PELLEGRINO, supra note 2, at 74-84. The tests may also indicate
some symptoms of CFS, such as low grade fever, sore throat, and swollen lymph nodes. STOFF &
PELLEGRINO, supra note 2, at 74-84.
52. See Walders v. Garrett, 765 F. Supp. 303, 305 n.4 (E.D. Va. 1991).
53. STOrs & PELLEG NO,supra note 2, at 74-84. See also English, supra note 4, at 964.
54. Cf STOFF & PELLEGRINO, supra note 2, at 60.
55. Price, supra note 2, at 514.
56. Price, supra note 2, at 514. A "kvetch" is a person who complains in a nagging or a
whining way. WEosran's NEw WORLD DICTIONARY 784 (2d ed. 1980).
57. Jordan, supra note 27.
58. Price, supra note 2, at 516.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol13/iss1/4

8

Kozinets: The Americans with Disabilities Act: Does the ADA Protect a Perso
19951

Does The ADA ProtectA Person With CFS?

of a woman's complaints than a man's complaints. 9 Society expects
men to be stoical6 A physician may believe that a man would not
complain unless he is quite ill. Yet societal stereotypes portray women
as frequent complainers t As a result, a physician may be more willing
to believe a man's symptoms than a woman's symptoms.
Even if a physician believes in the veracity of a person's symptoms,
the physician must then conclude that these symptoms constitute a
disease 6 The CDC explains that a CFS diagnosis is proper when a
person suffers both severe fatigue and four or more of the other eight
symptoms listed above for at least six consecutive months and her
physician has eliminated other possible diseases6 A physician may or
may not be willing to apply this formula to diagnose CFS." Some
physicians do not put any credence in the CDC formula because they do
not believe in the existence of CFS. 65 Other physicians believe CFS exists, but they refuse to base a medical diagnosis on subjective symptoms.
As Dr. Stoffnotes, western medicine relies "almost exclusively on objecIn Walders v. Garrett," a former civilian
tive, laboratory data. '
Navy employee with CFS claimed unlawful discharge under the Reha59. See Feiden, supra note 4, at 43.
60. Jordan, supra note 27.
61. See generallyLani Guinier et al., Becoming Gentlemen: Women s Fxperiences at One Ivy
League School, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 72 (1994).
62. STOi:F & PELLEGRiNO, supra note 2, at 61-86.
63. UnderstandingCFIDS, supra note 5, at 74.
64. Interview with Robert J. Bloomberg, M.D., in Tempe, Ariz. (Aug. 17,1992); interview with
Cynthia Whitcher, M.D., in Davis, Cal. (Oct. 24, 1994).
65. However, official recognition of CFS may discourage skepticism of the disease. For
example, in a letter from Pete Wilson, Governor of the State of California, to the Chronic Fatigue
Syndrome Association, the Governor said that "Chronic Fatigue Syndrome is a debilitating illness
that... can disrupt lives by interrupting both education and employment, leading to untold hardship .... I am hopeful that greater understanding and increased coordination to combat this disease
will be fostered in the near future... :' Letter from Pete Wilson, Governor of the State of Cal.
(Feb. 28, 1991). In addition, the California legislature, in declaring May 12, 1994 as CFIDS
Awareness Day, stated:
WHEREAS, Patients living with chronic fatigue syndrome face great difficulty in receiving social services and public assistance despite suffering extreme debilitation; and
WHEREAS, There is a great need for education and training medical professionals
regarding chronic fatigue syndrome... and be it further Resolved, That this day be set
aside to help strengthen the efforts to promote research and education into chronic fatigue
syndrome ....
A. Con. Res. 130,1993-94 Leg., Regular Session, Chapter 33; see also LivingHell: The Real World
of Chronic Fatigue Syndrome (Authentic Pictures video documentary, 1993) (stating that funding
for CFS research by the National Institute of Health rose from less than $500,000 in 1986 to over
S3 million in 1992).
66. SToFF & PELLEGRINO, supra note 2, at 60.
67. 765 F. Supp. 303 (E.D. Va. 1991).
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bilitation Act of 197368 (hereinafter "Rehabilitation Ac"). 69 The
defendant referred to one physician's comments in arguing that the
plaintiff did not have CFS: "[T]he government referred to the fact that
plaintiff was examined for this lawsuit by Dr. Gaetano Molinari, who
concluded that he found insufficient objective criteria to support a CFXDS
diagnosis, although he conceded that plaintiff may well have the disease."7' The physician's comment that the plaintiff "may well have the
disease" indicates that the physician refused to base a diagnosis on
subjective symptoms. Walders is illustrative of the notion that proving
a CFS diagnosis is difficult because the medical skepticism of subjective
symptoms hinders one's effort to acquire the necessary evidence.7t
However, after a person begins receiving medical treatment and
compiling records, she may succeed in proving that she has CFS.72 In
Besade v. Interstate Security Services,7 3 a workers' compensation case,
the Compensation Review Board acknowledged' the plaintiff's CFS
diagnosis after her treating physician testified on her behalf. 4 Dr. Paul
Cheney testified that the plaintiff had
CFS because she suffered from all
75
of the symptoms on the CDC list.
The defendant argued that Dr. Cheney's opinion was "unduly
speculative and therefore not stated in terms of reasonable medical
probability. '76 In granting the disability benefits, the review board held

68. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-794 (1988 & Supp. V 1994).
69. Walders, 765 F. Supp. at 304.
70. Id. at 305 n.4.
71. By contrast, physicians and other health care providers who practice alternative medicine
currently provide the bulk of available support to CFS sufferers. One reason for this is that
mainstream medicine and alternative medicine have different philosophies of medical treatment.
Mainstream physicians treat the cause of the disease. Since the cause of CFS is unknown, these
physicians are at a loss as how to treat it. See English, supra note 4, at 964. English "talked with
scores of fellow patients who went to [the medical] profession for help, but who came away humiliated, angry, and afraid.' English, supra note 4, at 964. However, alternative health care
providers such as acupuncturists, homeopathic or holistic practitioners, and herbalists seek to
strengthen the body's natural healing abilities so that the body - not the practitioner - treats the
cause of the disease. Since alternative medicine does not require knowledge of the cause of the
disease, it may be helpful to a CFS victim. Timothy J. Smith, M.D., Are You Tired?, ON HEALTH
& LONGEVITY, Fall-Winter 1993, at 2.
72. See Administrative Digests, CONN. L. TRIBUNE, May 2, 1994, at 8A (citing Besade v.
Interstate See. Serv. (Comp. Review Bd. Worker's Comp. Comm'n 1383 CRB-2-92-2, Feb. 28,
1994)); Walders v. Garrett, 765 F. Supp. 303 (E.D. Va. 1991).
73. AdministrativeDigests, CONN. L. TIUB'NE, May 2, 1994, at 8A (citing Besade v. Interstate
Sec. Serv. (Comp. Review Bd. Worker's Comp. Comm'n 1383 CRB-2-92-2, Feb. 28, 1994)).
74. Id.
75. Id.; for the symptoms listed by the CDC, see supra note 49 and accompanying text.
76. AdministrativeDigests, CONN. L. TkiBUNE, May 2, 1994, at 8A (citing Besade v. Interstate
Sec. Serv. (Comp. Review Bd. Worker's Comp. Comm'n 1383 CRB-2-92-2, Feb. 28, 1994)).
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that utilizing the CDC symptom list to diagnose CFS is not an unduly
speculative process. The Board stated that "Dr. Cheney confirmed that
his opinions were expressed with reasonable medical probability."'7
Similarly, in Walderi,58 the court recognized expert testimony as proof
of the plaintiff's CFS diagnosis. 9 The Walders court stated, "Dr.
Hallowitz testified that he examined the plaintiff and performed a series
of tests to rule out potential causes of her symptoms other than CFIDS.
[i.e., CFS] ... [Tihe Court concludes that he is knowledgeable about
the condition and there is no reason to doubt his diagnosis in this
case." ' Thus, in both the Rehabilitation Act and workers' compensation contexts, it is clear that a person may prove that she has CFS if her
physician testifies on her behalf.
In addition to expert testimony, medical records may help prove the
existence of CFS. In Ringle v. Shalala,8' the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recognized the plaintiff's diagnosis because
her physician documented her subjective complaints in medical
records. 2 In Ringle, a person with fibromyalgiao3 was denied Title II
disability benefits s In a prior hearing, an administrative law judge
("A.L ) rejected a physician's opinion that the plaintiff had fibromyalgia
because the opinion was based "almost entirely on [the plaintiff's]
subjective complaints of pain, rather than any objective, clinical find'
ings."85
The court agreed that "[a] claimant's subjective allegations of
disabling pain must be supported by [medical] evidence."' 6 Yet, in
reversing the ALl's decision, the curt concluded that the documentation
of the plaintiff's complaints in her medical records was sufficient to
prove her diagnosis because her complaints were "consistent with a
diagnosis of fibromyalgia, which is difficult to detect with medical
testing."' It is clear then that medical records in support of a treating

77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Id.
765 F. Supp. 303 (E.D. Va. 1991).
Id. at 305 n4.
Id.
No. 92-35224, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 30973 (9th Cir. Nov. 17, 1993).

82. Id. at *4.
83. Fibromyalgia is a CFS-related disease. Interview with Donna Russell, Coordinator of the
Davis Fibromyalgia Chronic Fatigue Syndrome Support Group, in Davis, Cal. (Dec. 5, 1994); see
FIBROMYALGIA SYNDROME (FMS): A PATIENT'S GUIDE. For a copy of this document contact:
Fibromyalgia Network, Bakersfield, Cal.

84.
85.
86.
87.

Ringle, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 30973, at *1.
Id. at *2.
Id. at *3.
Id. at *4.
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physician's testimony may persuade a court to recognize a CFS
diagnosis.
The cases discussed above suggest several practical tips for people
with CFS. Those suffering from CFS should seek medical treatment as
soon as possible. 8 They should find a physician who is familiar with
CFS" and make sure that the physician documents their subjective
complaints and orders lab tests that could potentially establish the
objective CFS symptoms. Taking these measures may increase a
person's chance of proving that she has CFS.
Once a person with CFS has proven her diagnosis, she must show
that CFS constitutes a physical or mental impairment within the scope of
the ADA." This part of her case is far less problematic than the initial
proof of illness. Indeed, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission91 ("EEOC") defines a physical or mental impairment as any
physiological disorder affecting one or more of the following body
88. In addition to seeking treatment, a person with CFS should actively follow her physician's
advice. See Walders v. Garrett, 765 F. Supp. 303, 306 n.9 (E.D. Va. 1991). Ignoring such advice
may cut against her at trial. Id. The Navy claimed that some of plaintiff's absences were due as
much to her own behavior as to CFIDS...." Id One of the plaintiff's co-workers testified that
the plaintiff "routinely watched late night television, did not intend to follow medical advice ...[and] voiced objections to medical advice ...

."

Id.

89. See Walders, 765 F. Supp. at 305 nA (illustrating that a physician who is uninformed about
CFS may undermine a person's claim by offering damaging testimony).
90. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (Supp. V 1994); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g) (1994); see 29 C.F.R.
app. § 1630.2(h)(1994). "It is important to distinguish between conditions that are impairments and
physical, psychological, environmental, cultural and economic characteristics that are not
impairments." Ida
.91. The EEOC is a federal agency that was created by Congress to enforce Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964. U.S. EQUAL EMIPLOYMENT OPPORTUNInY CoMISSION, INFORMATION FOR
THE PRIVATE SECTOR AND STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 3. Since 1979, the EEOC has also
enforced the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 104-12, 81 Stat. 602
(current version at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988 & Supp. V 1994), the Equal Pay Act of 1963, Pub
L. No. 88-38,77 Stat. 56 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.), and Section 501
of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 367 (codified as amended at 29
U.S.C. 501 (1988 & Supp V 1994). Id On July 26, 1992, the EEOC began enforcing Title I ofthe
ADA. Id A person who believes that she has been discriminated against by an employer, labor
union, or employment agency when applying for a job or on the job because of race, color, sex, religion, national origin, age, or disability, may file a complaint with the EEOC within 180 days of
the alleged discriminatory act. Id. at 3-4. If a state or local agency is authorized to grant relief
based on a state or local anti-discrimination law, the person must seek relief there first. Id. at 11.
The EEOC may file a lawsuit on behalf of the injured person if it finds reasonable cause to believe
that discrimination occurred and conciliation efforts have failed. Id. at 11-12. If the EEOC decides
not to sue, the person may file a private suit within 90 days ofreceiving a notice ofright-to-sue from
the EEOC. Id. Since enforcement of the ADA began, individuals with disabilities have filed 27,000
complaints resulting in only 15 EEOC lawsuits nationwide (most were AIDS related). Telephone
Interview with Sharon Hawley, Enforcement Manager, EEOC (July 19, 1994). The EEOC strives
to resolve disputes with employers before suit. Id.
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systems: neurological, musculoskeletal, special sense organs, respiratory,
cardiovascular, reproductive, digestive, genito-urinary, heroic and
lymphatic, skin, and endocrine; or any mental or psychological disorder.92 Since CFS covers both physical and mental symptoms, it is an
"impairment" under the ADA. 3
B. Substantially Limits a Major Life Activity
Once a person proves that she has a physical or mental impairment,
she must then show that this impairment rises to the level of a disability 4 An impairment may constitute a disability if it substantially limits
one or more of a person's "major life activities."9' The EEOC defines
"substantially limits" as "unable or significantly restricted" from
performing a major life activity compared to the average person.96
Major life activities include working, caring for oneself, performing
manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning,
sitting, standing, lifting, and reading.97 The EEOC makes clear that
"this list is not exhaustive. 98 Thus, CFS may rise to the level of a
disability if it prevents or significantly restricts a person's ability to
perform basic life actifities.
A person with CFS may prove that CFS substantially limits her
ability to work,99 yet she must be careful to prove that CFS significantly
restricts but does not prevent her from working at all."' She must be
mindful of the next element of her prima facie case: proving that she is
qualified to work. I1 Thus, if a person with CFS proves her disability

92. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(1).
93. See Walders, 765 F. Supp. at 309 (holding that "CFIDS plainly fits [the] definition of a
handicap.").
94. See 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(). "Determining whether a physical or mental impairment
exists is only the first step in determining whether or not an individual is disabled. Many
impairments do not impact an individual's life to the degree that they constitute disabling impairments.' Id.
95. Id. § 1630.2(g).
96. Id. § 1630.2(j).
97. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i); see also U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION,
AMERICANS WMTH DISABiLrTs ACT HANDBOOK 1-27 (1992).
98. 29 C.F.R. app. § 16302(1).
99. 29 C.F.R. § 16302(i)-a).
100. See Walders v. Garrett, 765 F. Supp. 303, 312-13 (E.D. Va. 1991).
101. Id. at 309. In Walders, "[p)laintiff's handicap caused her to have a high level of
unpredictable absenteeism and thus prevented her from performing the essential functions of her job
at a satisfactory level of productivity." Id.at 312.
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by demonstrating
that she is "unable" to work, her Title I claim may
°2
fail.'
However, a CFS plaintiff may have difficulty proving that the
disease limits but does not prevent her from working. The assertion may
not logically flow from the evidence that she presents in proving a CFS
diagnosis.' 0 3 After reviewing medical records and expert testimony on
the debilitating effect of CFS, a court may not only be convinced that a
person has CFS, but that she is too sick to work."°
In both Collins
v. Sullivan' and Ringle v. Shalala,0 5 the courts held that the plaintiffs were disabled because they could not work. 7 Similarly in
Walders v. Garrett,"8 the court held that the plaintiff was disabled
because "when CFIDS strikes plaintiff, she may be completely debilitated
e.g., she cannot come to work or even get out of bed."'0 9 The court
then relied on this evidence to declare that the plaintiff was unfit to
work."0 As a result, the plaintiff's employment discrimination claim
failed."' Clearly problematic for the CFS plaintiff is the fact that the
evidence she uses to establish that she is an "individual with a
disability"'" 2 may undermine her effort to prove that she is a "qualified
3
individual with a disability.""
One solution to this dilemma is that a person with CFS may prove
that she is only unable to perform certain jobs."4 The EEOC states:
"[W]ith respect to the major life activity of 'working' ... [t]he term
'substantially limits' means significantly restricted in the ability to
perform a... broadrange ofjobs ... compared to the average person
having comparable training, skills, and abilities.""' Thus, in Reynolds
v. Brock,"6 the court held that the plaintiff was disabled because her

102. See id. at 314.
103. Id. at 314.
104. Id. at 312-14.
105. No. C-92-2890-DLI, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3898 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 22, 1993).
106. No. 92-35224, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 30973 (9th Cir. Nov. 17, 1993).
107. Collins, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3898, at *11-*12; Ringle, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 30973,
at *5-*7.
108. 765 F. Supp. 303 (E.D. Va. 1991).
109. Id. at 309 n.17.
110. Id. at 312-13.
111. Id. at 314.
112. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (Supp. V 1994).
113. Id
114. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.20) (1994).
115. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2 (j)(3)-j)(3)(i) (1994) (emphasis added).
116. 815 F.2d 571 (9th Cir. 1987).
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impairment prevented her from doing certain jobs."7 In Reynolds, an
epileptic clerk typist claimed unlawful discharge under the Rehabilitation

Act.

8

In reversing a summary judgment decision for the defendant,

the court held that the plaintiff's epilepsy substantially limited her ability

to work because government regulations restricted the types ofjobs available to her."9 Thus, the plaintiff was disabled because she could only
perform desk jobs. Similarly, a person with CFS may be able to perform
a desk job2 ' but not manual labor because the disease makes her feel

"sluggish and sore." ' ' Alternatively, a person with CFS may be able
to perform manual labor functions but not a job requiring cognitive
stress.' 2 Thus, a person with CFS may prove that she is both disabled
and "qualified" to work by showing that CFS significantly restricts her
from performing a broad range of jobs, but does not prevent her from
working entirely.
However, a person with CFS may avoid the work issues by claiming
that CFS substantially limits another major life activity.'2' The EEOC

states: "[I]f an individual is substantially limited in any other major life
activity, no determination should be made as to whether the individual

is substantially limited in working."''

4

Thus, a person may claim that

CFS substantially limits her ability to walk or care for herself."z

In

Walders v. Garrett,2 6 the court acknowledged that CFS impairs a
person's major functions including walking and dressing."

CFS may

117. Id. at 574.
118. Id. at 572.
119. Id. at 574. The plaintiff was unable to perform hazardous jobs, military jobs, or any job
requiring her to drive to work. Id.
120. Walders v. Garrett, 765 F. Supp. 303, 313 (E.D. Va. 1991) (discussing how a Navy secretary 'ith CFS "(was] able to meet deadlines and. . . received positive evaluations:).
121. McGrath, supra note 36, at A2.
122. A medical research study on CFS concluded that subjects with CFS attribute their inability
to remain at work to complaints of: difficulty concentrating; impaired memory; difficulty with word
finding, problem solving, and abstract thinking. John DeLuca et al., Information Processing
Efficiency in Ch ranicFatigueSyndrome andMultiple Sclerosis,50 ARcH. NEUROL. 3 01, 302 (1993);
see also McGrath, supra note 36, at A2. People with CFS complain that the illness plays with their
mind. McGrath,supra note 36, at A2. Yet, a person with CFS may be able to do physical tasks.
A person with CFS decided not to practice law, but to take up construction work for this reason.
Telephone Interview with a carpenter with CFS (Sept. 1994) (name withheld upon request).
123. For a list of the major life activities see supra text accompanying note 97.
124. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.20).
125. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i); see 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2G). "[Ain individual who, because of
an impairment, can only walk for very brief periods of time would be substantially limited in the
major life activity of valking." Id.
126. 765 F. Supp. 303 (E.D. Va. 1991).
127. Id. at 309 n.17.
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also impair reading, yet another major life activity.
One person with
CFS noted that the disease renders it difficult to think clearly and even
to read the newspaper.'
If a person can prove that CFS substantially
restricts one of these activities, she may not need to discuss her ability
to work. However, a person with CFS may have limited success in
avoiding the work issue because employees often need to walk or read
on the job. 30 Thus, a person with CFS may have limited success in
claiming that she is disabled because her disease substantially limits a
non-work activity.
Finally, a person may prove that she is disabled because of
hospitalization resulting from CFS.' 3 ' In Walders v. Garrett,the court
cited School Board of Nassau County v. Arline' to establish that the
plaintiff was an "individual with a disability."'3
In Arline, a teacher
with tuberculosis claimed unlawful discharge under the Rehabilitation
Act. 3 4 The United States Supreme Court held that "hospitalization [is]
a fact more than sufficient to establish that one or more of [plaintiff's]
135
major life activities were substantially limited by her impairment."'
As a result, the Walders court noted that the plaintiff was disabled
because she was hospitalized for treatment of CFS.136
Thus,
hospitalization may support a person's claim that CFS substantially limits
her life activities without discussing specific activities such as work.
M.

QUALIFIED INDIVIDUAL WITH A DISABILITY

Once a person with CFS proves that she is an "individual with a
disability," she must next prove that she is "qualified" to do the job she
seeks.' 37 The EEOC defines a "qualified individual with a disability
[as] an individual with a disability who satisfies the requisite skill,
experience, education, and other job related requirements" of the job she
desires and who can perform the essential functions of the job with or

128. English, supra note 4, at 964.
129. English, supra note 4, at 964.
130. See Walders, 765 F. Supp. at 309 n.17 (explaining how the restrictions on the major life
activities resulted in plaintiff's absenteeism).
131. See id.
132. 480 U.S. 273 (1987).
133. Walders, 765 F. Supp. at 309 n.17.
134. Arline, 480 U.S. at 275.
135. Id. at 281.
136. Walders, 765 F. Supp. at 309 n.17.
137. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (Supp. V 1994); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m) (1994).
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This definition covers two
without reasonable accommodation. 38
issues: 1) pre-employment credentials; and 2) on-the-job abilities.139

Similar to any other job applicant, a disabled person must have adequate
credentials for the job.1 4' For instance, a person will not have much
success in claiming employment discrimination under the ADA if an
employer refuses to hire her because she lacks the necessary educational
In addition, a person
background, employment, skills, or licenses.'
with a disability must also be able to perform the job once she arrives at

the factory or office.' 42 As the ADA states, a "qualified" individual
with a disability must be able to perform the "essential functions" of the
job with or without "reasonable accommodation."' 43 Thus, to state a

claim under Title I of the ADA, a person with CFS must delineate the
the reasonable accommodafunctions of her job that are "essential" and144

tions that may enable her to perform them.

138.
139.
140.
141.

42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)C5)(A); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m).
29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(m).
29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(m); Lucero v. Hart, 915 F.2d 1367, 1371-72 (9th Cir. 1990).
Lucero, 915 F.2d at 1371-72. However, an employer may only impose limited inquiries

regarding an applicant's health status. See EEOC ENFORCEMiENT GUiDANcE ON PRE-EMPLOYMENT

ACt, Daily Lab Rep. (BNA) No. 96, D-1
INQuiRIEs UNDER THE AhmIcA s Wrr DISABILT
(May 20, 1994). Among the inquiries permitted are: whether the applicant can perform the essential
functions of the job with or without reasonable accommodation; a description or demonstration of
how the applicant would perform these functions; and whether the applicant meets the attendance
requirements of the job? Employer's are prohibited from such inquiries as: do you have AIDS?;
have you ever filed for workers' compensation?; have you ever been treated for mental illness?; how
many sick days were you sick last year?; do you have a disability which would interfere with your
ability to perform the job? Id. at D-2.
142. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8); 29 C.F.R § 1630.2(m).
143. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8).
144. For example, a job applicant with CPS might want to work as a computer programmer.
First, a court may determine that data input is an "essential function!' of the job because it is a
fundamental job task. Second, the court would examine how the applicant proposes to accomplish
this task. Typically, a computer programmer may work two three-hour shifts with a lunch hour in
between. Yet the applicant may not be able to work for three consecutive hours due to her CFS
symptoms. She may need to modify her work schedule so that she takes a ten minute break every
hour and works through lunch to compensate for her illness. This modified work schedule is a
"reasonable accommodation"' because it is a change in the traditional method ofperforming the job
that enables the applicant to attain a level of productivity equal to other workers. See Gerald T.
Holtzman et al., Reasonable Accommodation of the DisabledWorker-A Jobfor the Man or a Man
for the Job, 44 BAYLOR L. REV. 279, 291 (1992). As a result, the court may conclude that the
applicant is a "qualified individual with a disability" because she can perform the essential functions
of the job with a reasonable accommodation. Id. at 290 (exploring the inter-relationship of the
"qualified individual" criterion and the "reasonable accommodation" requirement).
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A.

Essential Functions

An "essential function" is a fundamental job duty of the employment position.14 Typically, a job requires an employee to do several
different tasks. While some of these tasks may be fundamental to the
job, others may be marginal. 4 ' Thus, a person with CFS may ask
herself. what is the point of my job? 4 7 The EEOC requests courts to
engage in a case-by-case analysis to determine whether a job function is
"essential."' 4 8 Job functions that a person with CFS may have difficulty performing and that a court may determine to be essential are
discussed below.
1. Regular, Predictable Attendance
A person with CFS may have difficulty maintaining a regular,
predictable work schedule. 149 The attendance of a person with CFS
5
may be irregular because she may frequently be absent on sick days.1 D
In addition, her attendance may be unpredictable because she may not be
able to predict when these sick days will occur. As was noted in
Walders, CFS impairs a person's major activities "albeit not on a
consistent basis."'' A person with CFS also commented, "[s]ymptoms
come and go, wax and wane. What is true today may be partially true
tomorrow or totally false next week."'" As a result, CFS may disrupt
a person's work schedule.
Regular, predictable attendance may be an essential job function
depending on the type of job a person holds.
If a job requires one

145. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1).
146. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1); see Ackerman v.Westem Elec. Co., 643 F. Supp. 836, 846 (N.D.

Cal. 1986).
147. Lainey Feingold, Co-Director of Disability Rights and Education Defense Fund Clinical

Program, Address at U.C. Davis School of Law (Oct. 20, 1994) [hereinafter Feingold].
148. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(m). Whether ajob function is essential the court must determine:
(1) if the individual satisfies the prerequisites for the position, such as educational background,
employment experience, skills, licenses, etc.; and (2) if the individual can perform the essential functions of the position held or desired, with or without reasonable accommodation. Id.
149. Telephone Interview with Kathy MeClaire, Employee Rehabilitation Counselor, U.C. Davis
(July 28, 1994); see Walders v. Garrett, 765 F. Supp. 303, 305-06 (E.D. Va. 1991).

150. Walders, 765 F. Supp. at 306.
151. Id. at 309 n.17.
152. English, supra note 4, at 965.
153. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(2)(i)-(iii). Courts may consider the following factors in
determining an "essential function": (1) that the position exists to perform this specific function; (2)
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to meet frequent deadlines, and a small staff precludes the availability of
others to compensate for one's absences, then regular, predictable
attendance may be essential to that job." To determine whether a job
function is essential, the EEOC suggests that a court examine "the con'
sequences of not requiring the incumbent to perform the function."155
As two courts have noted, the consequences of not requiring a person to
regularly attend work may be severe when a job entails frequent deadlines.156 In Carr v. Reno,"5 a coding clerk with an ear disability
claimed unlawful discharge under the Rehabilitation Act."'
The
plaintiff's job involved coding papers related to recent arrests. 59 Her
papers were not ready for a daily 4:00 p.m. pickup because her disability
caused attacks of dizziness and vomiting, and she was frequently absent
from work "for prolonged periods of time without warning."" ° The
court noted that "[i]f the Office falls behind in this process, it must
expend considerable resources to catch up."''
For this employer,
added expense was a consequence of the plaintiff's irregular attendance.
Similarly in Walders v. Garrett,the plaintiff's principle duty was to
process government requests for information within a statutory deadline
of ten days." The plaintiff fell behind in her workload because she
was absent between sixty and ninety days per year due to CFS. 6 3
'Moreover,
plaintiff's absenteeism was essentially random
[and] ... plaintiff's supervisors could not count on her attendance or
predict her absences:"'
The plaintiff's employers testified about the
"need for rapid processing and closing of cases and the substantial
pressure placed on the [office] by the Navy... and by the Department
of Justice."' 65 Just as added expense resulted for the employer in Carr,
the Walders case illustrates that client dissatisfaction may be another
consequence of irregular attendance.

that a limited number of employees are available for the position; and (3) that the skills required to
perform the job may be highly specialized. Id.

154. Walders, 765 F. Supp. at 310; Carr v. Reno, 23 F.3d 525, 529 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
155. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3)(iv).
156. Walders, 765 F. Supp. at 310; Carr, 23 F.3d at 529.
157. 23 F.3d 525 (D.C. Cir. 1994).

158. Id. at 527-28.
159.
160.
161.
162.

Id. at 527.
Id.
Id.
Walders, 765 F. Supp. at 305 n.2.

163. Id. at 306.
164. Id. at 310.

165. Id. at 305.
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The employer and person with CFS may avoid these consequences
if another employee in the office is able to "fill in" during absences.'6
Yet this may not be possible if the office has a small staff.1 67 The
EEOC suggests that a "function may be essential because of the limited
number of employees available among whom the performance of that job
function can be distributed."'6 In Carr and Walders, there were no
other employees available to mitigate the consequences of plaintiffs
irregular attendance.1 69 In Carr, the court noted that "when [the
plaintiff], without advance warning or prompt explanation, did not show
up for work, the Office was forced to rely on a single clerk because it
could not know when a replacement (assuming one could be found)
would be needed.""'7 Similarly in Walders, the plaintiff's office had
only fifteen employees; they worked in teams of five. 171 When the
plaintiff was absent "no one else was willing or able to take her
place."'" The court commented that each employee had to "pull his
or her full weight.""l
In determining the consequences of irregular
attendance in jobs that combine small staffs with frequent deadlines, both
Carr and Walders held that regular, predictable attendance was an
essential job function."
However, regular, predictable attendance may not be essential if a
person's job does not entail frequent deadlines or where other employees
can compensate for another's absences. 7 5 In Walders, the court discussed another Navy employee with CFS, a secretary, who failed to
maintain regular, predictable attendance. 76 The court noted that the
secretary's duties, typing and processing forms, did not entail substantial
deadlines and that other secretaries assumed her responsibilities when she
was absent. 77 Unlike the Walders plaintiff, the Navy did not contend
that regular, predictable attendance was an essential function of the
secretary's job.'7 8 It is clear then that, in planning her career, a person

166. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(2)(i)-(iii).
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.

See Walders, 765 F. Supp. at 313-14.
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(2)(ii).
Walders, 765 F. Supp. at 313-14; Carr, 23 F.3d at 527.
Can, 23 F.3d at 527.
Walders, 765 F. Supp. at 304-05.
Id. at 313.
Id. at 314.
Id. at 309-10; Carr, 23 F.3d at 530.
See Walders, 765 F. Supp. at 313.

176. Id.
177. Id.
178. See Id.
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with CFS should avoid a job with frequent deadlines and no support
staff.
2. Manual Labor
A person with CFS may not be able to perform manual labor
functions because CFS often depletes one's physical stamina. 179 A
manual task may be an essential function if a person spends a large part
of her day performing it. 80 To determine if a job function is essential,
the EEOC suggests that courts examine both whether all employees with
the same job perform the task, and the proportion of an employee's day
Yet as Ackerman v. Western Electric
spent performing the task.'
Co., s indicated, these two guidelines may conflict.' 3 While all
employees may perform a certain task, a particular employee may spend
less time on that task than other employees. 18' In Ackerman, an "index
2" cable installer with a respiratory disability claimed unlawful discharge
under California's FEHA.1' The job required "index 2" installers to
perform physically demanding work such as ironwork and cabling."
Due to her disability, the plaintiff could not perform these tasks, and her
employer discharged her upon a determination that this work was an
essential job task. 7 In holding for the plaintiff, the court decided that
ironwork and cabling were not "essential functions" of the plaintiff's job.
The court explained that "[W]hile ironwork and cabling are essential
functions for index 2 installers as a group, they are not essential to any
particular individual's performance of the job"' 88 The court held that:
"[tlhe amount of that work.., performed by [plaintiff] was proportionately so insignificant [11.5%] that it cannot be considered an
essential function of her position."'$9 Thus, while examining whether
other employees perform a certain task may be helpful in determining the
essential function issue, the analysis is not determinative. A person with
CFS may pursue a position that entails a task that she lacks the physical
179. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
180. 29 C.F.R. § 16302.n)(3)(iii) (1994).
181. Id. § 1630.2(n)(3)(iii), (v), (vii).
182. 643 F. Supp. 836 (N.D. Cal. 1986).

183. See t. at 846.
184. Id.
185.
186.
187.
188.

Id. at 841 (citing Cal. Gov. Code § 12940 (West 1992)).
Id. at 844.
See id.at 842.
Id. at 846.

189. Id.
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stamina to perform if that task comprises a minor portion of her day.
3.

Productivity

A person with CFS may not be able to maintain a certain level of
productivity because of the severity and inconsistency of her symptoms.19
A specific production standard may be an essential job
function depending on when an employer sets this standard. 9' The
EEOC states:
[T]he inquiry into essential functions is not intended to second guess
an employer's business judgment with regard to production standards ....If an employer requires its typists to be able to accurately
type 75 words per minute, it will not be called upon to explain why an
inaccurate work product, or a typing of 65 words per minute, would not
be adequate.' 2
However, the EEOC also notes that a court may suspect an employer of
discrimination if the employer selects a particular production standard
that excludes an individual with a disability."9 Thus, a court may be
more or less critical of an employer's production standard depending on
whether the employer set it before or after a disabled person was hired.
If an employer sets a production standard before a person begins
work, a court may defer to the employer's judgment that the standard is
an essential job function.' 94 In Lucero v. Hart,95 a clerk typist who
suffered from an emotional disability claimed unlawful discharge under
the Rehabilitation Act. 96 The job required the ability to type forty-five
words per minute ('wpm"). 97 The plaintiff was discharged after her
employer found that she could only type forty-four wpm. 9 8 In holding
for the employer, the court stated:
[Plaintiffi] was technically not 'otherwise qualified' for her job .... If

190. See supra notes 150-53 and accompanying text
191. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3)(i)-(ii) (1994).
192. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(n).
193. Id.
194. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3)(i). "Evidence of whether a particular function is essential includes ...Ithe employer's judgment as to which functions are essential ... ." Id.
195. 915 F.2d 1367 (9th Cir. 1990).
196. Id. at 1369-70.
197. Id. at 1369.
198. Id.
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44/wpm was sufficient, why is that not the minimum requirement? If
44/wpm is close enough, why not 43/wpm; or 40/vpm? While this
seems a very technical distinction, the standard was set at 45/wpm for
a reason, and it is not the court's job to establish minimum qualification standards for county employees in Sacramento.... [Plaintiff]
was not fired because of her handicap. She was fired because she
could iiot meet the minimum requirements of her job. ... "1
The court was unwilling to challenge the employer's production standard
even if the consequence was draconian in nature. Clearly pivotal is the
fact that the employer set the standard prior to any awareness of the
employee's disability. Thus, such a standard is lawful. As a result, a
person with CFS should only pursue a job if she can meet the existing
production standards that were established prior to her application?"0
However, if an employer sets a production standard after an
individual begins work, a court may not defer to the employer's judgment that the standard is an essential job fanction.20 ' The EEOC
explains: "[I]f it is alleged that the employer intentionally selected the
particular level of production to exclude individuals with disabilities, the
employer may have to offer a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for
its selection.""2 2 In American Federation of Government Employees
Local 51 v. Baker, 3 a coin checker with a learning disability, high
blood pressure, and a skin allergy claimed unlawful discharge under the
Rehabilitation Act.P' Her employer attempted to discharge her after
she failed to inspect 500 sets per day.2 ' However, the plaintiff was
granted a temporary injunction to stop the discharge.2 6 In holding for
the plaintiff, the court concluded that inspecting 500 sets per day was not
an essential function of plaintiff's job20 7 because the quota was imposed after plaintiff had been on the job for many years.208 Moreover,
other employees had difficulty meeting the quota which was subsequently

199. Id. at 1371-72.
200. See C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1). "Evidence of whether a particular function is essential includes ... [w]ritten job descriptions prepared before advertising or interviewing applicants for the
job ... ." Id. § 1630.2(n)(3)(ii).
201. See 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(n).
202. Id.
203. 59 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) %41,550,at 71,216 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 28, 1992).
204. Id. at 71,216-17.
205. Id. at71,218.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 71,220.
208. Id. at 71,223.
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reduced to 450 sets per day.2 9

The court concluded that "[t]hese

production standards were not the minimum requirements for the job, nor

were they even 'reasonable and attainable."' 2 t0 Similarly, in Reynolds

v. Broc, 211 an employer told the plaintiff that in order to keep her job

she had to process ten applications per day.2 2 The plaintiff failed to

meet this standard and was discharged. 23 The court held that a genuine issue of fact existed as to whether the employer set an unrealistically
high production standard in order to impede the plaintiff's efforts.2 14

Here, the production standard was not considered an essential job
function, as the employer set that standard after becoming aware of the
employee's disability.

B. Reasonable Accommodation
Once a person with CFS determines her "essential" job duties, she
must then prove that she can perform these duties with or without

"reasonable accommodation."2 " An "accommodation" is a modifica-

tion in the traditional method of performing a job function.21 6 A court

determines whether or not an accommodation is "reasonable" on a caseby-case basis?' 7 To be sure, a person with CFS need not prove that

Id. at 71,220.
Id. at 71,223.
815 F.2d 571 (9th Cir. 1987).
Id. at 572. Plaintiff had already suffered three epileptic seizures at work. Id.
Id.
Id. at 574.
42 U.S.C. § 12112(B)(5)(A)-(B) (Supp. V 1994); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m) (1994).
See 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(o)(i)-(iii). The term "reasonable accommodation" means:
(i) Modifications or adjustments to a job application process that enable a qualified applicant with a disability to be considered for the position such qualified applicant
desires; or
(ii) Modifications or adjustments to the work environment, or to the manner or
circumstances under which the position held or desired is customarily performed, that enable a qualified individual with a disability to perform the essential functions of that position; or
(iii) Modifications or adjustments that enable a covered entity's employee with a
disability to enjoy equal benefits and privileges of employment as are enjoyed by its
other similarly situated employees without disabilities.
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(i)-(iii); see also DREDF, supra note 10; Accommodation, LAB. REL.
EXPEDiMER 550:104 § 5 (June 20, 1994).
217. See School Bd. ofNassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273,287 (1987) (holding that courts
must make an individualized inquiry into possible forms of reasonable accommodation); see also
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.

U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, BOOKLET 15, THE AMRImcANs

,VIMTH

DIsAnIurITs ACT: QUEsiONS & ANsi\Vsws 6 (1992) (explaining that "[a]ccommodations must be
made on an individual basis because the nature and extent of a disabling condition and the require-
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the accommodation that she requests is reasonable

18

Rather, she need

only request the accommodation; her employer has the burden to prove
that the accommodation is unreasonable.

The employer's burden of

proof stems from its legal duty to provide the reasonable accommodation.2 9 Yet, if a court determines that a requested accommodation is unreasonable, a person may fail to prove that she can perform
the essential fumetions of her job with or without the "reasonable
accommodation." 0 Since this failure will undermine her claim that

she is a "qualified individual with a disability," a person with CFS
should anticipate the possible arguments an employer may make against
the accommodation she requests 2 ' By anticipating such arguments,
a person with CFS may prepare to rebut her employer's claim that her
requested accommodation is unreasonable.

ments of a job will vary in each case:'); Cf.D'Amico v. N.Y. State Bd. of Law Examiners, 813 F.
Supp. 217, 221-23 (W.D.N.Y. 1993) (holding that the court, not the employer, has the final say as
to whether plaintiff's requested accommodation is reasonable).
218. See WValders v. Garrett, 765 F.Supp. 303, 308 (E.D. Va 1991); see supra notes 12-13 and
accompanying text.
219. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A). "[Tihe term "discriminate" includes ... not making
reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified
individual with a disability... :' Id. Thus, since an employer is required to accommodate a
disabled person, the employer must explain why it failed to do so. Walders, 765 F. Supp. at 308.
But see 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.9 (1994) (stating that employers are only obligated to accommodate
known limitations and in general, it is the responsibility of the disabled individual to inform her
employer that she needs an accommodation) (emphasis added).
220. For example, a computer programmer with CFS may not be able to perform the essential
functions of her job unless she modifies her work schedule to allow rest breaks. If her employer
proves that rest breaks impose an undue hardship because they significantly slow down production
efficiency, a court may conclude that no reasonable accommodation exists that will enable the
programmer to perform the essential functions ofherjob. As a result, the programmer may not be
a "qualified individual with a disability" and her Title I claim may fail. See Lucero v. Hart, 915
F.2d 1367, 1372 (9th Cir. 1990).
221. In addition to the arguments of undue hardship and scope of an employer's duty, an
employer may also argue that ADA requirements of employers to reasonably accommodate may
conflict with the National Labor Relations Act, which requires an employer to negotiate changes in
work conditions with the union. Stephen M. Crow & Sandra J. Hartman, ADA Versus NLRA.: Is
a Showdown Imminent Over Reasonable Accommodation?, 44 LAB. LJ. 375, 376-77 (1993).
Commentators have noted that
the language, legislative history, and underlying purpose of the ADA suggests that the
terms of a collective bargaining agreement should not automatically trump an employer's
duty of reasonable accommodation .... Instead.... [t]he courts should balance the
interests of the disabled employee against the expectational interests of the employees
covered by the labor agreement.
Eric HJ. Stahlhut, Playing The Trump Card: MayAn Employer Refuse to Reasonably Accommodate
Under The ADA By Claiminga CollectiveBargainingObligation?,9 LAB. LAW. 71, 91 (1993). Cf.
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3)(v)(1994) (listing "the terms of a collective bargaining agreement" as
evidence of whether a particular function is essential).
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One argument an employer may offer against a person's requested
accommodation is that the accommodation constitutes an "undue
hardship "t'
An undue hardship is a significant difficulty or expense
imposed on the employer'
A court determines undue hardship on a

case-by-case basis. 4 Factors that a court may consider include the
cost of the accommodation n5 an employer's financial resources, and
the impact of the accommodation upon the employer's operation. n 6
Anticipating how a court may rule on an employer's undue hardship

claim is difficult because a person cannot be certain as to which legal
standard a court will apply. In deciding a Title I claim, a court may rely
on case law under the Rehabilitation Act and/or case law under the
ADA. 7 These two bodies of case law propose different legal standards for determining undue hardshipP 8
Case law under the
Rehabilitation Act applies a standard first developed under Title VII of
23 the
the Civil Rights Act 9 In Trans World Airlines v. Hardison,

Supreme Court held that an employer need not incur more than de minimis cost in accommodating an employee's religious beliefsP' Thus,
an accommodation may not be reasonable if it imposes more than a small
cost on the employer. However, Congress specifically rejected this
standard in the House Education and Labor Committee's report

accompanying the ADA: "the Committee wishes to make it clear that
222. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A); 29 C.F.t. § 1630.2(p)(1). For a comprehensive survey of
these issues see Robert B. Fitzpatrick, ReasonableAccommodation and Undue Hardshipunder the
ADA: Selected Issues, FED. BAR NEvs & J., Jan. 1992, at 69.
223. 42 U.S.C. § 1211 1(10)(A); 29 C.F.R. § 163 0.2 (p)(I).
224. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10)(B)(i)-(iv); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(p)(2)(i)-(v).
225. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10)(B)(i); 29 C.F.R. § 16 30.2(p)(I)Ci). Costs may include the purchase
of new equipment or hiring additional staff. Feingold, supra note 147. Typically, the cost of a
reasonable accommodation is not high. Feingold, supra note 147. For example, 50% of
accommodations cost no money and 25% of them cost under $50. Feingold, supra note 147.
226. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10)(B)(ii)-iv); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(p)(2)(i)-(v). The impact may be a
slow-down in production efficiency or even the breakdown of morale. See 29 C.F.R. app.
§ 1630.2(p). An employer is not required to sacrifice production efficiency to accommodate an
employee. See id. In addition, since a disabled employee has the right to confidentiality regarding
her disability, an employer may not be able to explain to other employees why one employee is
entitled to receive an accommodation; jealousy may result. James G. Frierson, An Employer's Dilemma: The ADA's Provisionson Reasonable Accommodation and Confidentiality, 43 LAB. LJ.
308, 310 (1992).
227. Telephone Interview with Sharon Hawley, Enforcement Manager, EEOC (July 19, 1994).
228. Barbara E. Lee, Reasonable Accommodation Under the Americans with DisabilitiesAct:
The Limitations of the RehabilitationAct Precedent, 14 BERXLEY J. EMtPL. & LAB. L. 201, 215
(1993).
229. Id.
230. 432 U.S. 63 (1977).
23 I.Id. at 84.
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principles enunciated by the Supreme Court in TWI v. Hardison... are
Under the ADA, reasonable
not applicable to this legislation ....
accommodations must be provided unless they rise to the level of... a

significantly higher standard than articulated in Hardison."'2

Thus,

under the ADA, an accommodation may be reasonable even if it imposes

a large cost to the employer?23 Since a person with CFS cannot be
certain which legal standard a court may apply, she must anticipate that

a court may rule that the accommodation she requests imposes an undue
hardship 4on her employer if the cost of the accommodation is moderate

to high?1
Another argument that an employer may offer against a person's
requested accommodation is that the employer is not required to provide
the accommodation because the employer has already fulfilled its duty
by providing a prior accommodation. 5 Again, anticipating whether
or not a court will agree with the employer is difficult because of the
uncertainty of the legal standard. Both the ADA and the Rehabilitation

Act require an employer to make a reasonable effort on behalf of a
disabled person in order to fulfill the employer's duty of reasonable
accommodation. 6 Yet the standard for determining reasonable effort

may differ depending on the case law applied by the court. Under the
Rehabilitation Act, an employer's effort need only be minimal to fulfill

its duty of reasonable accommodation?

7

The problem with this legal

232. H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 68 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 346, 350.
233. See id. But see 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.9. An accommodation must be adequate to enable
the individual to perform the essential functions ofthejob. Id. The accommodation does not have
to be the "best possible" accommodation. Id.
234. But see Lee, supra note 228, at 216-17 (suggesting that a court may tolerate the moderateto-high cost of an accommodation due to the new, enlightened policy of the ADA).
235. See 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(o). An employer is not required to reallocate essential
functions or maintain a person's salary level when the accommodation is a lower grade job. Id.
236. The test for reasonable effort is an objective one - an employer's good faith effort in
reasonably accommodating a disabled person is not determinative. See Mantolete v. Bolger, 767
F.2d 1416,1423 (9th Cir. 1985). InMantolete, a person vith epilepsy claimed that, under the Rehabilitation Act, the U.S. Postal Service improperly denied her employment. Id. at 1417. The
defendant claimed that the plaintiff's disability made it unsafe for her to handle a letter sorting machine and that making the machine safe would be prohibitively expensive. Id. at 1420. In acknowledging expert testimony that the plaintiffwould simply need a plexiglass guard and a pair of
$30. tongs, the court held that "a good faith or rational belief on behalf ofthe employer will not be
a sufficient defense to an act of discrimination:' Id. at 1423. The determination of whether the
accommodations are reasonable must be made by the court de nove. Id. (emphasis added).
237. See Lucero v. Hart, 915 F.2d 1367, 1372 (9th Cir. 1990); Carr v. Reno, 23 F.3d 525,52829 (D.C. Cir. 1994). For an explanation of the reasons behind the legal standard regarding reasonable accommodation under the Rehabilitation Act see Rosalie K. Murphy, Reasonable Accom-
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standard is that the employer's prior accommodation may be legally
sufficient even though it is ineffective in enabling a disabled person to
perform the essential functions of her job. In Lucero v. Har3 38 and
Carr v. Reno,2 9 both defendants provided certain accommodations
which were ineffective, and yet both courts held that each defendant had
nonetheless fulfilled its duty of reasonable accommodation 4 In noting that the plaintiff's emotional and physical problems prevented her
from responding to the accommodations, the Lucero court held that
"[the defendant's] attempts to accommodate [the plaintiff] were no less
reasonable due to the fact that [plaintiff] was emotionally and physically
debilitated at [the] time."241 Similarly in Car, the accommodations
offered by the employer did not enable the plaintiff to perform her
job.2 42 In refusing the plaintiff's request that the court make an
individualized inquiry into other possible accommodations, the court
concluded that it is not required to go on a "wild goose chase every time
a plaintiff invokes the Rehabilitation Act."' 243 A court may conclude
that a person's requested accommodation is unreasonable because her
employer already fulfilled its duty of reasonable accommodation.
By contrast, case law under the ADA holds that a disabled person
has the righte4 to an effective accommodation.24 Thus, an employer

modation and Employment DiscriminationUnder Title Iofthe Americans With DisabilitiesAct, 64
S. CAL. L. REV. 1607, 1624-27 (1991). Murphy explains that originally, in Southeastern Comm.
College v. Davis,the U.S. Supreme Court interpreted the Rehabilitation Act as imposing no affirmative duty on an employer to reasonably accommodate a disabled person. Id, at 1622-24. Instead,
the Act required equal treatment of disabled persons-the Act prohibited discrimination but did not
require any supportive action. Id. at 1623. Yet in School Bd.ofNassau County v. Arline,the Court
held that an employer does have an affirmative duty of reasonable accommodation under the
Rehabilitation Act. Id. at 1625. However,
[w]hile the Supreme Court has now acknowledged the employer's duty to accommodate
workers under section 504, lower courts continue to rely on the idea that section 504's
prohibition of discrimination does not require employers to take positive steps. This misconception is illustratid in cases where federal employees brought causes of action under
both sections 504 and 501 of the Rehabilitation Act.
Id. For instance, the court in Fitzgeraldv. Green Valley Area Education Project, "viewed even
simple accommodations (requiring no financial cost and little administrative burden) as beyond the
scope of non-discrimination." Id. at 1627.
238. 915 F.2d 1367 (9th Cir. 1990).
239. 23 F.3d 525 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
240. Lucero, 915 F.2d at 1372; Carr,23 F.3d at 530.
241. Lucero, 915 F.2d at 1372.
242. Carr,23 F.3d at 529-30.
243. Id. at 530.
244. "The Americans with Disabilities Act gives civil rights protection to individuals with
disabilities similar to those provided to individuals on the basis of race, color, sex, national origin,
age, and religion." U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY CoMMissioN, INTRODUCTION TO THE
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has not fulfilled its duty of reasonable accommodation until it meets a
person's needs or proves undue hardship. The EEOC explains that an

employer must specifically tailor an accommodation to fit the needs of
a disabled person: "[1]t may be necessary for the [employer] to initiate
an informal, interactive process with the individual with a disability .... This process should identify the precise limitations resulting
from the disability and potential reasonable accommodations that could

overcome those limitations."' 2 6

Further, in D'Amico v. N.Y State

AMERICANS WIH DIsABiLrIEs ACT: QUESTIONS & ANSWERS, BOOKLET 15 (1992). However,
ADA equality is not the same as Title VII equality. See Lee, supra note 228, at 203-04. Disability
law advocates equal access as a means of non-discrimination, not equal treatment. Equal access
includes the notion of providing reasonable accommodation which, in a sense, is unequal treatment.
The ADA recognizes that equal treatment may preclude a disabled individual from succeeding in the
work place because she may not be able to perform ajob the same way as others. See Lee, supra
note 228, at 204. One court has held
Although employers can avoid other forms of discrimination, such as race and sex bias,
by becoming 'color blind' or 'sex neutral,' they cannot always eliminate discrimination
against persons with handicaps merely by providing them equal treatment. Equal
treatment can itself result in discrimination because of barriers to the participation of
handicapped individuals in certain tasks. Thus, different treatment, called accommodation, may be needed to eliminate these unnecessary barriers....
Estate of Reynolds v. Dole, 57 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1848, 1875 (N.D. Cal. 1990) (quoting
Kathryn NV. Tate, The FederalEmployer's Duties Under the RehabilitationAct: Does Reasonable
Accommodation OrAffirmative Action Include Reassignment?, 67 TEX L. REv. 781, 787 (1989)).
245. See 29 C.F.R. § 16302.(o)(ii). "The term 'reasonable accommodation' means...
[m]odifications or adjustments to the work environment ...that enable a qualified individual with
a disability to perform the essential functions of that position ...P"Id. (emphasis added); see also
D'Amico v. N.Y. State Bd. of Law Examiners, 813 F. Supp. 217, 221 (W.D.N.Y. 1993). Some
courts have held that reasonable accommodations must be effective. See Sargent v. Litton Systems,
Inc., 841 F. Supp. 956 (N.D. Cal. 1994). In Sargent, the court held that under California's FEHA,
a reasonable accommodation must be effective and stated that
The real flaw in defendants' assertion that no reasonable accommodation was possible
for Ms. Sargent's back condition is that they apparently terminated her without exploring
any other options with her in a meaningful way. The hallmark of the FEHA is the flexibility it requires of employers to work with its disabled employees to accommodate their
needs.
Id. at 962.
246. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o). The EEOC's interactive process raises the issue of when and how
an employer may elicit information concerning the physical or mental limitations of a disabled
person. An employer may receive such information from a person's physician, although limitations
may exist in what employers may ask health professionals and what these professionals should say.
See generally David K. Fram, Examining the Relationship Between Employers and Health
ProfessionalsUnder the ADA, LAB. LJ., May 1993, at 307 (explaining that the ADA "dramatically
alters the way employers and occupational health professionals should work together."). In addition,
an employer may receive information directly from the disabled person. Interview with Lorraine
Beaman, Counselor, U.C. Davis Disability Resource Center, in Davis, Cal. (July 13, 1994). Yet a
disabled person may be reluctant to disclose such information in fear of discrimination. Id. A
disabled person should disclose her limitations after she gets ajob offer and before she starts working. Id. This avoids the risk that an employer may fail to hire her because of her disability, and
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Board of Law Examiners,247 the court implied that an accommodation
is reasonable only if it succeeds in aiding a disabled person.248 In
D'Amico, a law student with a visual disability charged the State Board
of Law Examiners with failing to reasonably accommodate her under the
ADA.249 The plaintiff needed four days to complete a state bar examination because her disability caused extreme fatigue and she could only
work three to four hours per day." The defendant granted her rest
breaks and extended test hours during the traditional two day period but
refused to allow her four days to complete the exam.25 In requiring
the defendant to grant the four day period in order to provide the plaintiff
with a competitive chance to pass the exam, the court stated:
[T]here is no doubt in this case that [defendant] did make some
accommodations for plaintiff. They are not insubstantial. The ADA,
however, requires [defendant] to make 'reasonable accommodations'
under the circumstances in light of plaintiff's disability... The
purpose of the ADA is to guarantee that those with disabilities are not
disadvantaged. ... The purpose of the ADA is to place those with
disabilities on an equal footing .... [T]he most important fact that the
Court must consider in determining the reasonableness of [defendant's]
accommodations is the nature and extent of plaintiff's disability. 2
Thus, the defendant's effort to accommodate the plaintiff was not determinative. Instead, the court would only rule that the defendant fulfilled
its duty of reasonable accommodation if the accommodation actually
aided the plaintiff. 3 Since the ADA requires an employer to provide
an effective accommodation, a person with CFS has a greater chance that
a court will conclude that her requested accommodation falls within the
scope of her employer's duty of reasonable accommodation. As a result,

also avoids the possibility that delaying the disclosure will create ill will with her employer. Id.
In addition, a disabled person should be honest about her limitations and explain in detail how they
affect her life. Timothy Font, Attorney, Office of Legal Services, Cal. State Department of Health
Services, Address at U.C. Davis (April 13, 1994). Communication is the key to developing
successful employment relations. Id.
247. 813 F. Supp. 217 (W.D.N.Y. 1993).
248. Id. at 221.
249. Id. at 218.
250. Id. at 222. See generally Don I DeBenedictis, Bar Examiners Respond to the ADA:
Spurred by Suits or the Law, Officials GrantMore Test Time to DisabledApplicants, ABA J., Nov.
1992, at 20 (discussing other cases where ADA plaintiffs requested additional time to complete the
bar exam).
251. D'Amico, 813 F. Supp. at 218-19.
252. Id. at 221.
253. Id. at 221-22.
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she may be able to prove that she can perform the essential functions of
her job with reasonable accommodation, and therefore, she is a "qualified
individual with a disability." 4

The shift in legal standards from the Rehabilitation Act to the ADA
illustrates a change in social policy concerning individuals with
disabilities. s' The Rehabilitation Act reflects an attitude that society
must take pity on the disabled and provide them with services and
financial assistance.?5 6 The reasoning behind this attitude is the belief

that disabled people are less competent than others because they cannot
perform a job the same way as others. 7 The ADA policy differs from
the policy of the Rehabilitation Act in that the ADA distinguishes

between an individual's competence and the manner in which she performs a job.5 8 A disabled individual may be competent because she
possesses skill and talent equal to other individuals. 59 Her inability to
perform a job the same way as others perform it does not signal a defi-

ciency in her, but rather a deficiency in her work-place. 2

The Ameri-

254. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (Supp. V 1994).
255. Lee, supra note 228, at 202.
256. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101. It is interesting to note the change in language from"handicapped
individual" (used in Southeastern Comm. College v. Davis, 422 U.S. 397, 400 (1979)) which suggests a disadvantaged or substandard individual, to the ADA's "individual with a disability," which
suggests a person with a unique characteristic. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(9). Congress has found
that "t]he continuing existence ofunfairand unnecessary discrimination andprejudice denies people
with disabilities the opportunity to compete on an equal basis ... costs the United States billions
of dollars in unnecessary expenses resulting from dependency and non-productivity ..."'Id.
257. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(2)(5) (Supp. V 1994). Congress has found that "individuals with
disabilities are. . . relegated to a position of political powerlessness in our society, based on
characteristics ... resulting from stereotypical assumptions not truly indicative of the individual
ability ofsuch individuals to participate in, and contribute to, society.... " Id. The Supreme Court
demonstrates this characterization of incompetence by stating that "a person who suffers from a
limiting physical or mental impairment stillmay possess other abilities that permit him to meet the
requirements of various programs." Southeastern Comm. College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 406 n.6
(1979) (emphasis added).
258. See Lee, supranote 228, at 204. The emphasis in the ADA is not on whether a person can
do ajob but on the method a person utilizes to do it. See Lee, supra note 228, at 204. A disabled
individual "may not be able to do the job as it has been done in the past. Yet the simple fact that
a job has always been performed in a certain way does not presuppose that alternative ways are
unacceptable; they may even be superior." See Lee, supra note 228, at 204.
259. This was addressed at On the Job: Successful People with Disabilities, Panel Presentation
at U.C. Davis (April 13, 1994). Speakers at the presentation included a manic-depressive nurse, a
blind attorney, a paraplegic fire department dispatch officer, a deaf telephone company employee,
and a teacher with a learning disability.
260. Dr. Paul Longmore, Professor ofHistory, San Francisco State Univ., Address at U.C. Davis
(April 14, 1994) (explaining that the ADA represents a revolution in social consciousness regarding
the meaning of the term "disability!). The professor sketched out three analytical models which led
up to this revolution: the moral model, in which society viewed a disabled person as the
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can office or factory is handicapped if it is not designed to benefit from
the abilities of all.2 6 Once an employer modifies a job, a person with
a disability may attain a level of prodiictivity equal to others.2 62 Thus,
the ADA symbolizes a new kind of civil rights for disabled individuals
because it promotes equal access to the work-place."
This new

attitude may benefit a person with CFS who argues that her requested
accommodation is reasonable.
The ADA provides a non-exhaustive list of reasonable accommodations that includes a modified work schedule.2 In addition, a person
with CFS may benefit from reasonable accommodations such as the reas-

signment
of nonessential duties to other employees and working at
265
home.

embodiment ofcosmic moral disorder and thus she must be separated from society to lessen the risk
that she would disrupt the morals ofsociety; the medical model, in which society viewed a disabled
people as suffering from a biological deficiency that could be cured, but who should be separated
from society until she is normalized; and the minority model, in which society viewed disabled
people as belonging to a group with unique characteristics whose obstacles are not an inherent
deficiency but prejudice in society. Id.Thus, the ADA strives to celebrate plurality and promote
a society of tolerance. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(8). Congress has found that "the Nation's proper
goals regarding individuals with disabilities are to assure equality of opportunity, full
participation,
independent living, and economic self-sufficiency for such individuals ...:'ld.
261. U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNnTy COmIssiON, BOOKLET 15, Introduction to The
Americans with Disability Act: Questions and Answers (1992). By breaking down barriers to
employment, the ADA "will enable society to benefit from the skills and talents of individuals with
disabilities, will allow us all
to gain from their increased purchasing power and ability to use it, and
will lead to fuller, more productive lives for all Americans.' Id.
262. See 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.9 (1994).
The reasonable accommodation requirement is best understood as a means by which
barriers [e.g., physical obstacles, rigid work schedules] to the equal employment
opportunity of an individual with a disability are removed or alleviated .... Equal
employment opportunity means an opportunity to attain the same level of performance. .. as ...the average similarly situated employee without a disability.
Id.; see also D'Amico v.N.Y. State Bd. ofLaw Examiners, 813 F. Supp. 217,221 (W.D.N.Y. 1993)
(recognizing that "the ADA was not meant to give the disabled advantages over other applicants.").
"The purpose of the ADA is to place those with disabilities on an equal footing and not give them
an unfair advantage:' D'Amico, 813 F. Supp. at 221. The purpose of reasonable accommodation
is to enable disabled people "to perform as well as persons without limitations.' Estate ofReynolds
v. Dole, 57 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1848, 1871 (N.D. Cal. 1990) (quoting OFFICE OF FEDERAL
CONTRACT COMPLIANCE PROGRAM, ApFIRMATIVE ACTION FoRTHE HANDICAPPED: A HANDBOOK
Fop EMPLOYMET OPPORTUNITY SPECIALISTS OF THE OFFICE OF FEDERAL CONTRACT COMPLIANcE

PROGRMs 70-71 (1980)).
263. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(o). "[Ain accommodation is any change in the work environment
or in the way things are customarily done that enables an individual with a disability to enjoy equal
employment opportunities." Id. (emphasis added).
264. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(A)-(B); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o).
265. Other common reasonable accommodations that people with CFS may require include
limiting body movement (e.g., reducing walking or carrying; using a scooter or cart with wheels),
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1. Modified Work Schedule

A person with CFS may be able to perform the essential functions
of her job if her employer allows her to modify her work schedule?'

A modified work schedule may mean that a person does not work the
traditional eight hour shift with a lunch break.2 67 Four variations of the

traditional work schedule are possible: a modified full-time schedule, a
part-time schedule, a flexible work-when-able schedule, and a schedule
that allows for a leave of absence2 In deciding whether or not these
variations are reasonable, a court may apply a cost-benefit analysis.2 69
The main advantage of a modified work schedule is that it allows a

person with CFS to tailor her schedule to her CFS symptoms.270 Frequently asserted burdens of a modified work schedule include the costs
of keeping an office open during non-traditional hours (e.g., utilities,
security),27 t safety risks,2' extra personnel,273 a slow down in

frequent rest breaks (with the availability of a couch or mat on which one may lay down), flextime
(e.g., working on weekends), and lateral job changes (to alleviate cognitive or other stresses).
Telephone Interview with DJ. Hendricks, Counselor, Job Accommodation Network (June 30, 1994).
However, the ADA seems to limit the transfer of a person with a disability to another position.
Reassignment to a vacant position is also listed as a potential reasonable accommodation.
In general, reassignment should be considered only when accommodation within the
individual's current position would pose an undue hardship.... Employers should reassign
the individual to an equivalent position, in terms ofpay, status, etc., if the individual is qualified ....
29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.29(o).
266. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(2)(ii).
267. See 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(o).
268. See id.
269. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(p).
270. See Lembeck, supra note 3, at 59 (suggesting that a person with CFS set a schedule for
daily tasks which incorporates unplanned blocks of time).
271. Interview with Martha West, Professor ofLaw, U.C. Davis, in Davis, Cal. (July 11, 1994).
272. See Kimbro v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 889 F.2d 869, 878 n.8 (9th Cir. 1989) (finding that
working after-hours posed a safety risk because it meant that the plaintiff would be operating
dangerous equipment alone). In Kimbro, a machinist with a migraine disability claimed unlawful
discharge under the Washington state's disability discrimination law. Id. at 873. The plaintiff's
disability caused frequent absences from work. Id. In holding for the defendant, the court disagreed
with the "proposed accommodation of compensating for absent time by working after regular hours.'
Id. The court agreed with the lower court that safety considerations counselled against regularly
allowing an individual machinist to work by himself after hours. Id. Hiring an extra employee to
accompany the plaintiff during off hours may have mitigated this safety risk. However, the court
did not suggest that this was necessary to reasonably accommodate plaintiff. See id.
273. See Estate of Reynolds v. Dole, 57 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1848, 1874 (N.D. Cal.
1990) (holding that the lack of supervision made working after hours an unreasonable accommodation). InReynolds, a clerk-typist with epilepsy claimed unlawful discharge under the Rehabilitation
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production efficiency,2 74 and making existing facilities accessible to a
disabled person.2 75 The outcome of this cost-benefit analysis depends
on the specific circumstances of a person's job.2 76 As a result, a

modified work schedule may or may not be a reasonable accommodation.
A modified full-time schedule is a consistent full-time schedule that
utilizes non-traditional work hours.27 7 A person with CFS may benefit

from this schedule if her symptoms are somewhat predictable.27 For
instance, a person may build ten minute breaks into her work schedule
and, if necessary, work either a longer day or on the weekend to
compensate for the adjustment.279 Or if a person's symptoms are
worse during a particular time of day, she may adjust her work schedule

to avoid these difficult periods.28" Thus, if a person feels worse in the
morning, she should be able to arrive at work late and leave late on a

regular basis.28 ' As a result, a person with CFS may benefit from a
modified full-time schedule.
Similar to a modified full-time schedule, a part-time schedule may
enable a person with CFS to tailor a schedule to accommodate her

Act. Id. at 1850. The court noted that "[The plaintiff] asked for a change in her work schedule so
she would not have to walk home in the dark." Id. at 1874. "The request was denied because of
a Department policy that there be a supervisor in the office at all hours." Id.
274. See supra text accompanying note 226.
275. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(o) (suggesting that an employer provide "accessible break rooms"
as a reasonable accommodation). See Hendricks, supra note 265 (suggesting that a person with CFS
may use these break rooms to lay down during her rest breaks or that the employer may furnish a
mat or sofa on which a person with CFS may rest).
276. See 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(o). In addition, the policy ofthe ADA may affect the outcome
of a cost-benefit analysis. See supra notes 258-66 and accompanying text. Considering that the
policy of the ADA is more enlightened than the policies of the older disability laws, a person with
CFS may convince a court that hiring extra personnel is not an undue hardship under the ADA. See
supra notes 255-63 and accompanying text. The EEOC includes "providing personal assistants" as
a potential reasonable accommodation. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(o). A personal assistant may solve
the safety problem created by working alone. However, a personal assistant may not solve the
problem of needing the presence of a supervisor. Thus, a modified full-time schedule may or may
not be a reasonable accommodation depending on the costs of allowing a person to work during nontraditional work hours.
277. Hendricks, supra note 265.
278. Many people with CFS experience inconsistent symptoms; they are bedridden on some days
and feel fine on other days. Walders v. Garrett, 765 F. Supp. 303, 309 n.17 (E.D. Va. 1991). Yet
other people can control their symptoms and thereby possess a consistent, albeit reduced, energy
level. See supra note 15 and accompanying text. To these people, a consistent daily schedule may
be possible if it is designed to accommodate their needs. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
279. Hendricks, supra note 265. See McGrath, supra note 36, at A2 (suggesting that a person
with CFS adjust her life around rest breaks).
280. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(o). "An essential function customarily performed in the early
morning hours may be rescheduled until later in the day as a reasonable accommodation.... " Id.
281. See Id.
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symptoms. 2 A part-time schedule may benefit a person with CFS by
reducing the stress in that person's life. Since CFS is a stress-sensitive
disease, reducing stress may alleviate a person's symptoms and thus
In
allow her to maintain a regular, predictable work schedule.2 8
addition, a part-time schedule may not burden an employer with extra
costs such as keeping the office open during nontraditional work hours
or hiring extra personnel?'s However, a part-time schedule is not a
cost-free work schedule modification. A person with CFS bears the
burden of earning a part-time income, on which she may not be able to
support herself.28 Thus, part-time work may not be a practical reasonable accommodation for a person with CFS.
A third variation on the traditional work schedule is a flexible,
work-when-able schedule.286 The purpose of flexible hours 'is to
accommodate the inconsistency and severity of CFS symptoms.2
Unfortunately, while this type of work schedule may be most beneficial
to a person with CFS, it is also the most problematic for an employer.
In Kimbro v. Atlantic Richfield Co.,288 the court stated that, "ARCO's
legitimate need to schedule all machinist projects in advance made it
unreasonable to require ARCO to permit a disabled employee.., to use
unexhausted sick leave days intermittently on days or hours when his
migraine condition precluded his ability to work."2 9 Similarly in Carr
2"9 ' regular, predictable attendance
v. Reno290 and Walders v. Garrett,
was an essential function of jobs with frequent deadlines. 2 Walders
held that allowing the plaintiff to work merely when she was able was

282. See Robin Wilson, Portrait: Turning DebilitatingIllness Into OpportunitY, CHRON. OF

HIGHER EDUC., June 22, 1994, at A5 (describing a psychologist with CFS who "now works five
hours every morning.").
283. Interview with Timothy J. Smith, M.D., in Berkeley, Cal. (June 11, 1993).
284. If a person relies on traditional work hours in comprising her part-time schedule, her

employer will not need to incur the costs of keeping the office or factory open during non-traditional
work hours. For example, a person with CFS maybe present in the office during the normal, eighthour workday but only work six out of the eight hours and use the remaining two hours for rest
breaks; or a person with CFS, whose symptoms are more severe in the morning, could simply arrive
at the office or factory at noon and work half the day.
285. Langon v. Department of Health & Human Servs., 959 F.2d 1053, 1055 (D.C. Cir. 1992)

(noting that a person may need to work full-time "to pay her rent and survive.').
286. Carr v. Reno, 23 F.3d 525, 529 (D.C. Cir. 1994); see also Walders, 765 F. Supp. at 312
n.23.

287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.

See supra notes 151-52 and accompanying text.
889 F.2d 869 (9th Cir. 1989).
Id. at 878 n.8.
23 F.3d 525 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
765 F. Supp. 303 (E.D. Va. 1991).
Walders, 765 F. Supp. at 309; Can', 23 F.3d at 530.
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the kind of "extraordinary" accommodation not required by law.293
Carrnoted that "to require an employer to accept an open-ended 'work
when able' schedule for a time-sensitive job would stretch 'reasonable
accommodation' to absurd proportions and imperil the effectiveness of
the employer's public enterprise."2 ' 4 Thus, an employer's need to
maintain consistent productivity may render unreasonable a flexible,
work-when-able schedule.
Finally, the fourth variation on a traditional work schedule is a leave
of absence 95 A leave of absence may benefit a person with CFS
because it provides a period of time to recover from the illness.296 The
EEOC states that a reasonable accommodation may include "permitting
the use of accrued paid leave or providing additional unpaid leave for
necessary treatment ... .,297 However, just as with a part-time schedule, a leave of absence may not be affordable. Thus, a court may hold
that a leave of absence is not a reasonable accommodation if it deprives
a person with CFS of a source of income.298
Considering its enlightened social policies, a court may hold that a
modified work schedule is a reasonable accommodation under the
ADA.299 However, a person with CFS must take into account the
impact of such a schedule on her employer's business operation. As the

293. Walders, 765 F. Supp. at 313 n.25.
294. Carr, 23 F.3d at 531.
295. See Sargent v. Litton Systems, Inc., 841 F. Supp. 956, 961 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (suggesting
that a leave of absence was a reasonable accommodation). In Sargent, an office employee with
spondylitis, a back disability, claimed unlawful discharge under California's FEHA. Id. at 957-59.
The court denied the defendant's motion for summary judgment holding that the defendant did not
fulfill its duty to reasonably accommodate the plaintiff. Id. at 962. Yet one accommodation that
the defendant did offer the plaintiff was a leave of absence upon which the court looked favorably.
"Such an accommodation is certainly within the realm ofpossibilities that are envisioned by FEHA."
Id. at 961.
296. Walders,765 F. Supp. at 306. In Walders, the "plaintiff applied for a transfer of leave for
the purpose of entering a hospital for treatment of multiple viral infections related to her [CFS]. The
Navy subsequently permitted [the] plaintiff to use a combination of donated leave, leave without pay,
and accrued leave to cover her period of hospitalization... ." Id.
297. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(o) (1994).
298. See County of Fresno v. Fair EmpI. and Hous. Comm'n, 226 Cal. App. 1541, 1555 (1991)
(holding that a reasonable accommodation must preserve an employee's employment status). In
County ofFresno, an office employee with respiratory disabilities claimed that the county failed to
provide a reasonable accommodation under the FERA. Id. at 1545. The plaintiff's fellow employees smoked heavily. Id. The county granted the plaintiff a leave of absence to escape the smokefilled office. Id. 1550. In holding for the plaintiff, the court stated, "'Permitting' (the plaintiff] to
take an unpaid leave of absence succeeded in removing her from the smoke-filled environment, but
violated state law since she was precluded from enjoying the privileges of employment because of
her handicap." Id. at 1555.
299. See supra notes 255-63 and accompanying text.
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EEOC states, "undue hardship" includes a fundamental alteration to busi-

ness operation.3

Thus, a court may not require an employer to

compromise production efficiency or change the nature of the job, as

would occur by requiring the removal of frequent deadlines. As a result,
a person with CFS may be better off not to request a modified work
schedule unless she can safely and efficiently perform her job under such
a schedule.

2. Reassign Duties
Reassignment of certain job duties maybe a beneficial accommoda-

tion for a person with CFS. A person with CFS may not be able to
perform all of her job duties due to her physical or mental
symptoms'
She may request that the duties she cannot perform be
reassigned to another employee.302 This request may be a reasonable
accommodation if the duties are non-essential, marginal functions of her
job30

An employer is not required to reassign primary job duties to

reasonably accommodate a disabled person."' In Ackerman v. Western
Electric Co.,3°
" the court held that under California's FEHA, reassignment of ironwork and cabling to other employees was a reasonable
accommodation because the plaintiff would still be able to perform her
primary duty of wiring. The court stated that "[ain accommodation is not

required when its effect is... to supplant the need for [the plaintiff] .... However, the mere fact that accommodation might involve the
reassignment (even if preferential) of some duties to other employees
does not alone establish undue hardship. 30"
The court added the
language "even if preferential" because the duties that the plaintiff could
300. 29 C.F.R. app. § 163 0.2 (p) (indicating that ."undue hardship' refers to any accommodation
that would be unduly costly, extensive, substantial, or disruptive, or that would fundamentally alter
the nature or operation of the business.").
301. See supra notes 121-22.
302. Ackerman v. Western Elec. Co., 643 F. Supp. 836, 847 (N.D. Cal. 1986).
303. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(o). One reasonable accommodation is the restructuring of a job
"by reallocating or redistributing nonessential, marginal job functions" Id
304. See id. The EEOC explains that an employer is not required to reassign the primary duties
of a disabled employee because the employer would then have to pay two people to do one job. Id.;
see also Walders v. Garrett, 765 F. Supp. 303, 314 (E.D. Va. 1991) (noting that "[p]laintiff cannot
expect the Navy to require other employees to substitute for her during her frequent and
unpredictable absence."). Requiring a fellow employee to perform the essential functions of the
plaintiff's job, even on a temporary basis, is unreasonable because it would create an undue hardship
by causing a loss of office efficiency.
305. 643 F. Supp. 836 (N.D. Cal. 1986).
306. Id. at 851.
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not perform were the more strenuous functions of the job."7 Thus, the
resentment of a fellow employee in having to assume the plaintiff's less

desirable duties is not determinative."' As a result, a person with CFS
may request that an employer reassign duties that are beyond the scope
of a person's physical or mental stamina unless these duties compromise
the main functions of her job.
3.

Work at Home

A person with CFS may be able to perform the essential functions
of her job at home. 9 This accommodation may enable a person with
CFS to devote a greater percentage of her limited energy to her work by
not having to dress for or commute to work."' Working at home may
also better facilitate rest breaks. In addition, working at home avoids the
costs involved in keeping an office or factory open during non-traditional
hours.31 ' In Sargent v. Litton Systems, Inc.,12 the court suggested
that under California's FEHA, allowing a plaintiff to work at home was
The plaintiffs back disability
a reasonable accommodation.313
prevented her from commuting to work because sitting in a car was
extremely painful 14 The court noted that "[w]ith faxes and car phones
and home offices, it is no longer the case that an employee must always
As a result, the
be physically on site in order to perform her job.,3
flexibility of this accommodation makes it highly beneficial to a person
with CFS.
However, working at home may impose several costs to an
employer. Working at home may be impractical for a job that involves
turning in assignments under strict deadlines or face-to-face contact with
fellow employees or customers.3 16 In addition, an employer may be
307. Id.
308. Id.at 852; see Frierson, supra note 226, at 310.
309. Langon v. Department of Health & Human Servs., 959 F.2d 1053, 1057-58 (D.C. Cir.

1992) (holding that an employer must consider accommodating a computer programmer with
multiple sclerosis by allowing her to work at home).
310. Id. at 1054-55. See Wilson, supra note 282, at A-5.
311. Seesupratext accompanying notes 271-75 (discussing the relevant burdens imposed on the
employer).
312. 841 F. Supp. 956 (N.D. Cal. 1994).
313. Id. at 962.

314. Id. at 959.
315. Id. at 962.
316. See Langon, 959 F.2d at 1055. The defendant asserted that the plaintiff's job as a computer

programmer 'does not lend itself to work at home' because 'it requires a great deal of exactness,'
and because her assignments 'usually have specified short deadlines,' and 'most often require face-
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required to purchase a computer or other equipment to set up an at-home
office for a person?1 Finally, working at home raises issues concernAs a result, whether
ing work-place safety and overtime regulations.
a person with CFS should claim that working at home is a reasonable
accommodation depends on the needs of her job and the usefulness of
technology in performing it.
IV. CONCLUSION

An analysis of Title I of the ADA provides helpful information
regarding the issues, key facts, and obstacles of a CFS employment
discrimination case. To state a claim under Title I, a person with CFS
must prove that she is an individual with a disability and that she is also
qualified to do the job she seeks? 9 To prove that she is disabled, a
person with CFS must establish that she has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits a major life activity.32 Thus, she
must establish two key facts: 1) a CFS diagnosis; and that 2) CFS
substantially limits her major life activities.
In establishing these key facts, a person with CFS may face two
obstacles. First, she must present expert testimony and medical records
to prove her diagnosis? 2 Unfortunately, finding a supportive physician who will treat her, compile medical records, and testify on her
behalf, is difficult because the medical community is generally skeptical
of CFS.n Second, a person with CFS may find herself in a difficult
position; in presenting enough evidence to prove her diagnosis, she may
unintentionally convince a court that she is too sick to work. This
finding is problematic because Title I requires her to show that she is

to-face contact with report requestors."' IM ; see also Carr v. Reno, 23 F.3d 525, 530 (D.C. Cir.
1994). In Carr,"[The plaintiff] concede[d] that she could not work as a coding clerk at home, as

the job involve[d] tight 4:00 p.m. deadlines:' Id.
317. See 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(o) (suggesting that purchasing new equipment may be a

reasonable accommodation and thus not constitute an undue hardship). "[A]s a reasonable
accommodation, an employee with a disability that inhibits the ability to write, may be permitted to

computerize records that were customarily maintained manually." Id.
318. Jerome A. Hoffman, ADA May Let Workers Do Some Jobs atHome, NAT'L LJ., Oct. 26,

1992, at 33 (explaining that 'vorking at home also raises a host of interesting issues with respect
to the applicability and enforceability of common workplace legislation -such as the Occupational
Safety and Health Act and overtime regulation.").

319. See supra text accompanying note 13.
320. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (Supp. V 1994); 29 C..R. § 1630.2(g)(1).

321. See supra text accompanying note 25.
322. See supra text accompanying notes 39-66.
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both disabled and qualified to work.3 n Thus, a person with CFS has
the burdensome task of proving that she is sick enough to be considered
disabled but not too sick to work.
In proving that she is qualified to work, a person with CFS must
establish that she can perform the essential functions of her job with or
without reasonable accommodation.324 This issue covers two key elements: 1) that CFS does not prevent her from doing her job and 2) that
the accommodation she requests is reasonable.3 The major obstacle
to proving these facts is that CFS often interferes with a person's ability
to perform common essential job functions. A person's diminished
physical and mental stamina may compromise her ability to keep a
regular, predictable work schedule, perform difficult manual or cognitive
tasks, or maintain a predetermined standard of productivity.32 6 If she
cannot perform these functions, she must argue that they are not essential
to her job. Convincing a court of this may be difficult, considering that
many jobs require that these functions be satisfied.
Once a person proves that she can perform the essential functions
of her job with a particular accommodation, the burden is on the
employer to demonstrate that the accommodation is unreasonable.32 7
Fortunately, most accommodations do not impose a significant cost to
employers.32 Moreover, a court may consider the ADA's enlightened
policy of civil rights 2" in determining reasonableness. Since the ADA
seeks to move disabled people into the work place (and off public or
other financial assistance), a court may strive to give a person the accommodation she needs to perform her job.
In addition to providing information regarding the issues, key facts,
and obstacles of a Title I claim, an ADA analysis suggests precautions
and choices a person with CFS may consider in seeking a job. One
precaution is to find a supportive physician who will treat and record her
illness. Without such evidence, she may fail to prove her diagnosis.
Another precaution is that she should treat her illness. By reducing
stress, taking rest breaks, and engaging in other helpful activities, she

323. See supra notes 99-102 and accompanying text.
324. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m).

325. See supra text accompanying notes 136-44.
326. See supra notes 145-214 and accompanying text.

327. See supra text accompanying notes 215-17.
328. Rosalie K. Murphy, Reasonable Accommodation andEmployment DiscriminationUnder
Title I of the Americans with DisabilitiesAct, 64 S. CAL L. REV. 1607, 1632 (1995); see also Sue

A. Krenek, Beyond Reasonable Accommodation, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1969, 1971 (1994).
329. See supra text accompanying notes 255-63.
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may maintain a consistent energy level which will increase her ability to
perform her job.
Moreover, a person with CFS may make certain choices in seeking
a job. She may look for a job that suits her symptoms - i.e. - one
with flexible hours, infrequent deadlines, and independent tasks she can
perform at her own pace. Further, she should not seek ajob that requires
extremely costly accommodations. Although the ADA encourages courts
to find an accommodation reasonable, a person with CFS is probably not
qualified to perform a job if she requires expensive modifications or a
significant change in the nature of the job. Thus, a successful job search
requires accepting one's limitations and finding a suitable job.
Finally, analyzing a Title I claim may instill the ADA's empowering
attitude in a person with CFS. She should not be intimidated or
discouraged by disability law, her employer, or her illness. Disability
law is not an unchallengeable authority. It is a tool to promote one's
interests fairly. A person with CFS should argue that the ADA protects
her even if precedent holds otherwise. In addition, a person with CFS
should not passively accept discrimination or other forms of hostility
from her employer. If her employer claims that she cannot satisfactorily
perform her job, she should suggest new methods by which the job may
be performed. CFS may sap a person's energy, but it does not remove
one's skills, experience, and creativity in problem solving.
Lastly, a person with CFS may lessen the risk of unfair treatment
in the work place by taking control of her illness. She should not let
CFS destroy her life. She should define her limitations and adjust her
lifestyle to accommodate them. She may also participate in CFS support
organizations, which are available nationwide?3" The confidence and
self-worth she may feel in controlling her illness may endear her to her
co-workers and employer. In addition, she may encourage these people
to cooperate with her if she educates them about the disease and her
legal rights in a friendly and calm manner. While CFS robs her of
emotional and physical power, she may draw new power from the ADA.
The ADA is a relatively new law, and courts have only begun to
interpret it. As a result, a person with CFS cannot be certain how a
court may rule on a CFS employment discrimination case. However, if
a person follows the ADA's practical tips and adopts the ADA's attitude

330. The National CFS and Fibromyalgia Association with its main office in Kansas City,
Missouri, has 600 support groups worldwide. Also contact the CFIDS Association of America, in
Charlotte, North Carolina.
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of empowerment, she may never need to test the scope of ADA
protection in a courtroom.
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